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THE DUBIOUS ENUMERATED POWER 
DOCTRINE 
Calvin H. Johnson* 
Abstract: The enumerated power doctrine maintains that Congress 
may undertake only the activities specially mentioned in the text of the 
Constitution. Even the necessary and proper clause at the end of article I, 
section 8 and the tax clause at the beginning were at one time said not to 
expand Congress's power beyond the enumeration. 
The Constitution, however, neither says nor was intended to say 
that the listed powers were exclusive. The Articles of Confederation had 
limited the Congress to "expressly delegated" powers and the Framers 
removed the limitation because it had been "destructive to the Union." 
The best reading of the Constitution, moreover, is that it gives Congress 
the general power "to provide for the common Defence and general Wel-
fare of the United States." The phrase is a synonym for the Convention's 
supposedly mandatory resolution allowing Congress to "legislate for the 
common interests of the Union." The enumerated powers of article I, 
section 8 are best read as desirable activities that are illustrative of the 
appropriate national sphere, but not exhaustive. 
The claim that the enumeration of powers in article I, section 8 is 
exhaustive has never reflected actual practice. When activities necessary 
for the common interest arise, we generally find that they are authorized 
although not enumerated. Sometimes the unenumerated power is implied 
without any basis in text. Sometimes an unenumerated power is implied 
by stretching the words of the text to cover a desired power. The com-
mon defense and general welfare standard tells us how far to stretch the 
words of the enumeration and tells us when implied powers are appro-
priate. 
* Andrews & Kurth Professor of Law, University of Texas. The author wishes to 
thank Douglas Laycock, Sanford Levinson, Dennis Drapkin, Brenda Clayton, Dean 
Burnham, and David Robertson of the University of Missouri-St. Louis for helpful com-
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I. INTRODUCfiON 
The enumerated powers doctrine holds that the federal 
government has no general powers and no unexpressed powers. 
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution defines the powers of 
Congress in eighteen clauses. Clauses 2 through 17 allow Con-
gress, for example, to borrow money; to regulate commerce; to 
enact nationwide la\\s for bankruptcies, patents, copyrights, and 
naturalization; to establish post offices, post roads, federal 
courts, and a federal city; and to raise and support an army, 
navv, and militia.' Under the enumerated powers doctrine, the 
powers listed in these clauses are exhaustive. "The powers dele-
gated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal Government, 
are few and defined," Madison famously said in Federalist No. 
45. "Those which are to remain in the State Governments are 
numerous and indefinite. "2 
In the strictest Jeffersonian form of the argument, neither 
taxation nor the "necessary and proper" clause extend the range 
of the congressional powers beyond the list of sixteen in clauses 
2 through 17. Clause 1 of article I, section 8 allows Congress to 
lay and collect taxes "to provide for the common Defence and 
general Welfare." Clause 18 allows Congress to "enact all Laws 
necessary and proper" to effectuate other powers. When the Jef-
fersonians and the Hamiltonians split into adverse camps, how-
ever, the Jeffersonian branch insisted that both taxation and 
"necessary and proper" must be understood narrowly so as to 
keep the federal government within the boundaries of the enu-
meration. The tax clause was construed to mean only taxes nec-
essary to accomplish the subsequently listed powers of clauses 2 
through 17. The "necessary and proper" clause was construed to 
cover only those instrumental or administrative activities, too 
numerous and detailed be included in a Constitution, that were 
strictly necessary for the accomplishment of the goals enumer-
ated in clauses 2 through 17.3 "The tenet that Congress has only 
the power to provide for enumerated powers, and not for the 
general welfare," Jefferson wrote in 1811, "is almost the only 
1. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 2-17. 
2. FEDERAUST No. 45, at 315 (Madison) (Jan. 26, 1788). 
3. See, e.g., James Madison, Speech in the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 
16, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 438 (saying that the necessary and proper clause 
"gives no supplementary power, [but] only enables them to execute the delegated pow-
ers); id. ("It is at most but explanatory. For when any power is given, its delegation nec-
essarily involves authority to make laws to execute it."). 
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landmark which now divides the federalists from the republi-
cans."4 
The Constitution, however, neither says nor was intended to 
say that enumerated powers of clauses 2 through 17 are exhaus-
tive. The Framers used the Articles of Confederation as a model. 
In carrying over the Articles' wording and structure, they re-
moved old Article II's limitation that Congress would have only 
powers "expressly delegated" to it. When challenged about the 
removal, the Framers explained that the expressly delegated 
limitation had proved "destructive to the Union" and that even 
the passport system had been challenged.5 Proponents of the 
Constitution defended the deletion of "expressly" through to the 
passage of the Tenth Amendment. That history implies that not 
everything about federal power needs to be written down. 
The best reading of the Constitution, moreover, gives the 
federal government a general power "to provide for the common 
Defence and general Welfare." The Constitutional Convention 
adopted resolutions that were supposedly binding on the com-
mittees of the Convention that actually drafted the text. The 
governing resolution of the Convention on federal power pro-
vided that Congress would have all of the powers it had under 
the Articles of Confederation, plus the power "to legislate in all 
Cases for the general Interests of the Union."6 The drafting 
committees took the common defense and general welfare lan-
guage from Articles of Confederation, apparently as a synonym 
loyal to the governing resolution of the Convention. 
The standard, "to provide for the common Defence and 
general Welfare" is found in clause 1 of section 8, which gives 
Congress the power to tax. Once taxation is allowed for the 
common defense and general welfare, however, then the broad 
eighteenth clause allows Congress to enact "all Laws necessary 
and proper" to the "common Defence and general Welfare."7 As 
Chief Justice Marshall said in McCulloch v. Maryland, "Let the 
4. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin (June 16, 1817), in 12 
JEFFERSON PAPERS 71. 
5. Edmund Randolph, Debate in the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 24, 
1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 600-01. Randolph's statement has a special creditability 
because he served on the five-man Committee of Detail at the Philadelphia convention, 
see 2 FARRAND's RECORDS 97, which was the committee that removed the "expressly 
delegated" language from the Constitution. Randolph's statement was also a kind of dec-
laration against interest because it is not the kind of understatement of the Constitution's 
impact that the Federalists used to secure ratification. 
6. Gunning Bedford, Motion of July 17, 1787,2 FARRAND'S RECORDS 26. 
7. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 1 & 18. 
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end be ... within the scope of the constitution, and all means 
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, 
which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit 
of the constitution, are constitutional. "8 In 1830 Madison feared 
that the necessary and proper clause would transform the taxa-
tion clause into a justification for achieving the common defense 
and general welfare by any instrument.9 Madison dreaded that 
interpretation, but he could see no viable stopping point once 
taxation was allowed for the common defense and general wel-
fare. The interpretation that Madison dreaded in 1830 is in fact 
faithful to the text, to our values, and to our practices. 
The Founders, moreover, would not have drawn an impor-
tant distinction between "taxation" and "regulation." Indeed, 
they often switched the words as if "taxation" and "regulation" 
were synonyms. Regulation at the time of the founding was gen-
erally considered a lesser included power that the federal gov-
ernment could exercise as a matter of course once it commanded 
the paramount power of taxation. 
Reading the Constitution as giving a general power to pro-
vide for the general welfare means that the enumerated powers 
of clauses 2 through 17 are illustrative of what Congress may do 
within an appropriately national sphere, but are not exhaustive. 
The appropriate maxim of construction for section 8 is not the 
hard-edged expressio unius est exclusio alterius exclusio (to ex-
press one thing excludes all others), but the gentler maxim of 
ejusdem generis (of the same class or kind). Ejusdem generis 
means that unstated items covered by a general standard must 
be of the same class as the enumerated items, but the enumer-
ated items are not exclusive.10 The phrase, "to provide for the 
common Defence and general Welfare," in the first clause of 
section 8 provides the general principle that both enumerated 
and implied powers must satisfy. 
8. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,421 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.). 
9. James Madison, Supplement to the Jetter of November 27, 1830, to Andrew 
Stevenson, On the Phrase "Common Defence and General Welfare," in 2 THE FOUNDERS 
CONSTITUTION 453, 458 and 9 MADISON WRITINGS 411, 427. 
10. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
§ 47.17, at 188-200 (5th ed. 1992). While ejusdem generis cases are often ones in which 
the general standard follows enumerated items, it applies as well to cases in which the 
general standards precede the enumerated items. ld. at 188. Ejusdem generis accom-
plishes "the purpose of giving effect to both the particular and the general words, by 
treating the particular words as indicating the class, and the general words as extending 
the provisions ... to everything embraced in that class, though not specifically named by 
the particular words." National Bank of Commerce v. Estate of Ripley, 161 Mo. 126, 131, 
61 S.W. 587,588 (1901), cited in SINGER, supra, at 189. 
2005] DUBIOUS ENUMERATED POWER DOCTRINE 29 
The standard, "to provide for the common Defence and 
general Welfare," does limit the federal government to those 
things appropriately within the national sphere. "[C]ommon De-
fence and general Welfare" entered the Constitution as a syno-
nym for the "necessities" or "exigencies of the Union." 11 The 
Convention resolution that was supposed to bind the committees 
that drafted the constitutional language allowed Congress "to 
legislate in all Cases for the general Interests of the Union."12 
The phrase "for the common Defence and general Welfare of 
the United States," accordingly, empowers the federal govern-
ment power to provide for common or general interests neces-
sary to the union. There is no necessary agreement on what is 
appropriately "common" or "general" interest, but once it is de-
cided that an activity advances the common defense or general 
welfare, Congress may undertake it. Under this reading, the 
Constitution expresses a principle that governs the federal 
sphere and not just a list of petty powers. 
Finding a general power to provide for the common defense 
and general welfare is consistent with our constitutional prac-
tices. We have never maintained the enumerated powers doc-
trine consistently. Whenever the polity has decided that an un-
enumerated federal activity falls appropriately within the 
national sphere, interpreters of the Constitution have concluded 
that the activity is allowed by implication. Sometimes terms are 
stretched to allow the good national activity, and sometimes the 
activity is allowed without any connection to the constitutional 
text. 
From the start, the Framers found unenumerated federal 
powers. While the Framers often told the ratifiers that the enu-
meration was exhaustive, they also announced that the division 
between state and federal sphere would be set in the future by 
political competition. They also said that the federal passport 
system was to be allowed, although it was not on the list. The 
Framers asserted both sides of the inconsistency; they asserted 
both that the enumeration was exclusive and and that it was not 
exclusive. 
The pattern of finding legitimate but unenumerated federal 
powers continued in the early republic. Thomas Jefferson was 
11. 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS 142 ("necessities of the union" in draft by Governor 
Randolph); Report of the Commissioners assembled at Annapolis Convention, 31 JCC 
680 (Sept. 20,1786) ("exigencies of the Union") (emphasis added). 
12. Gunning Bedford, Motion of July 17, 1787,2 FARRAND'S RECORDS 26. 
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plausibly the most important advocate of limiting the federal 
government to enumerated powers, but even Jefferson was will-
ing to find implied powers, without any textual foundation, for 
things he wanted. Jefferson was unwilling to find the purchases 
of Louisiana and Florida territories to be within any enumerated 
power, even plausible ones. He also thought the purchases fell 
legitimately within the federal sphere. He therefore thought the 
purchases were implied by "sovereignty" or "necessity" without 
need for a textual justification. All the powers of Congress were 
enumerated, according to Jefferson, except when he wanted a 
power that was not enumerated. 
We have also found appropriately national but unenumer-
ated powers through tolerantly expansive interpretations of the 
constitutional text. Justice John Marshall in 1813 in McCulloch 
v. Maryland13 declared the enumerated power limitation to be 
triumphant, 14 but he simultaneously allowed the necessary and 
proper clause to justify a national bank. A central bank is a con-
venient instrument for supplying paper money, collecting taxes, 
and facilitating government borrowing, but chartering a bank is 
not an enumerated power. As the coalition that formed the Con-
stitution was splitting apart, the Jeffersonians concluded that the 
national bank was not sufficiently related to the enumeration to 
be necessary and insisted that the bank intruded upon the pro-
tected sphere of the states. 15 
In the last seventy years, an explosive expansion of the 
power to regulate commerce, the third clause of section 8, has 
found a wide range of appropriately national activities to be le-
gitimate. In 1787, the power under section 8 to "regulate Com-
merce" was a modest, even trivial, power, covering mercantilist 
programs involving deep-water shipping. The programs covered 
by the commerce clause turned out to be programs that the ma-
jority of the country did not want. Interstate commerce was not a 
significant part of the debate. The explosive expansion of the 
power to regulate commerce during the New Deal is best under-
stood as allowed by the principle, respected since the founding, 
that Congress would have the power to undertake activities ap-
13. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
14. Id. at 405 (saying that the government is "acknowledged by all to be one of 
enumerated powers" and that "[t)he principle, that it can exercise only the powers 
granted to it, (is) now universally admitted"). 
15. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for Es-
tablishing a National Bank (Feb. 15, 1791), in 19 JEFFERSON PAPERS 275; see also James 
Madison, Speech in the House of Representatives (Feb. 3, 1791), 1 ANNALS 1949, 1st 
Cong., 3d Sess. (denying that the "necessary and proper" clause could cover the bank). 
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propriate to the national sphere, that is, powers to "provide for 
the common Defence and general Welfare." 
Once we accept overtly unenumerated powers and the 
broad interpretation of malleable terms that the Constitution 
does contain, we can no longer take seriously the enumerated 
powers doctrine that remains. The doctrine serves mainly for use 
on an ad hoc basis against one's enemies and against programs 
one does not like for nonconstitutional political reasons. That 
use does not seem to be an appropriate role for constitutional 
law. Whatever the enumerated powers doctrine does, in any 
event, it cannot be taken seriously as prohibiting all implied or 
unexpressed powers or all broad readings of malleable terms. 
The "common Defence and general Welfare" standard pre-
serves the most important aspect of the enumerated power doc-
trine in that it confines the federal government to properly na-
tional goals. James Madison had proposed to allow Congress to 
protect rights and federal interests by vetoing state laws "in any 
case whatsoever,"16 but the Constitutional Convention rejected 
his plan.17 All of the Framers considered some governmental 
functions to belong solely to the states. Hamilton in Federalist 
No. 17 presumed that "the ordinary administration of criminal 
and civil justice" would be run by the states. 18 In Federalist No. 
33, he said that it would be federal usurpation if Congress at-
tempted "to vary the law of descent in any State" or "abrogate a 
land tax imposed by the authority of a State."19 "[T]he business 
of the foederal constitution was not local, but general," Wilson 
said before Independence Hall, such that the Convention saw no 
need to sgecify when a jury trial would be required in noncrimi-
nal cases. 0 Madison argued that "the great mass of suits in every 
16. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 10 
MADISON PAPERS 212; see also Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Apr. 
16, 1787), in 9 MADISON PAPERS 382-85 (proposing a veto in "all cases whatsoever"); 
Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Apr. 8, 1787), in 9 MADISON PAPERS 
368-71; Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 19, 1787), in 9 MADISON 
PAPERS 317-22. 
17. Voting outcome, July 17, 1787, in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS 28 (defeating the 
negative 2 states to 7 states), August 23, 1787, in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS 390-91 (defeat-
ing the negative 5 states to 6 against). 
18. THEFEDERALISTN0.17, at 107 (Dec. 5, 1787). 
19. THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 206 (Jan. 2, 1788). 
20. James Wilson, Address to a Meeting of the Citizens of Philadelphia, Oct. 6, 
1787, in 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS 101. 
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State lie between Citizen & Citizen, and relate to matters not of 
federal cognizance."21 Anti-Federalist James Monroe wrote that 
"[t]he obvious line of separation is that of general and local in-
terests."22 Anti-Federalist Melancton Smith mocked the pro-
posed Constitution as leaving to the states only the power "to 
make laws for regulating the height of your fences and the re-
pairing of your roads,"23 but even in his derision, he was express-
ing the consensus that the new federal government would func-
tion only in the general sphere. Limiting the federal government 
to the common sphere preserves state power whole as to the 
rest. That is plausibly more important than the specifics of the 
sixteen enumerated powers. 
Under the original understanding of the Constitution, what 
qualifies for "common defense and general welfare" might not 
be justiciable. Hamilton told the New York Convention that the 
division between the federal and state government was not a 
constitutional question. The division, he said, is: 
the proper business of the legislation: it would be absurd to fix 
it in the Constitution, both because it would be too extensive 
and intricate, and because alteration of circumstances must 
render a change of the division indispensable. Constitutions 
should consist only of general provisions [because] they must 
necessarily be permanent4 and . . . cannot calculate for the possible change of things. 2 
Both Madison and Hamilton argued that the division between 
the federal and state spheres would be governed by a political 
21. Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Oct. 18, 1787), in 13 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 408 (arguing that he could not see how George Mason 
thought that the federal judiciary would have dangerous tendencies given that the great 
mass of suits would be purely state issues.) 
22. James Momoe, Some Observations on the Constitution (1788), reprinted in 5 
STORING 290; accord Fallacies of the Freeman Detected by a Farmer, PHILADELPHIA 
FREEMAN'S J. (April1788) ("The perfection of a federal republic consists in drawing the 
proper line between those objects of sovereignty which are of a general nature and which 
ought to be vested in the federal government, and those of a more local nature and ought 
to remain with the particular governments"), reprinted in 3 STORING 18. 
23. Melancton Smith, Speech to the New York Ratification Convention, June 25, 
1788, in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 312. 
24. Alexander Hamilton, Speech to the New York Ratification Convention, June 
28, 1788, in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 364. 
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competition for the loyalty of the people.25 Modem commenta-
tors have made the same argument.26 Combining "common De-
fence and general Welfare" with deference to the people implies 
that there are only weak judicial constraints on the reach of the 
federal government, except prohibitions protecting individual 
rights. If the people should decide that an activity is appropri-
ately in the national sphere, then the Constitution, properly 
read, allows it. 
The decision to defer to a political decision is severable, 
however, from the definition of the "common Defence and gen-
eral Welfare." If the polity decides that the limits of the federal 
government are to be strictly enforced by judicial review, then 
the common defense and general welfare standard allows that.27 
Proponents of the Constitution sometimes argued that "general 
welfare" standard would confine the federal government to ac-
tivities of a properly national nature. "Civis" told South Caro-
lina: "You may observe, that their future power is confined to 
provide for the common defence and general welfare of the Un-
tied States. If they apply money to any other purposes, they ex-
ceed their power."28 Noah Webster argued to Pennsylvania that 
25. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 10 
MADISON PAPERS 205, 210-11 (arguing that there will be "a continual struggle between 
the head and the inferior members, until a final victory has been gained in some instances 
by one, in other by the other of them"); THE fEDERAUST No. 37, at 237 (Madison) (Jan. 
11, 1788) (arguing that neither the local nor the general government would entirely yield 
to the other, "and consequently that the struggle could be terminated only by compro-
mise"); THE F'EDERAUST No. 46, at 317 (Madison) (Jan. 29, 1788) (arguing that the peo-
ple in the future will become more partial to the federal than to the state governments 
only if the federal level offers "manifest and irresistible proofs of a better administra-
tion"); THE FEDERALIST No. 31, at 8 {Hamilton) (Jan. 1, 1788) (arguing that it would be 
a "vague and fallible" conjecture as to where politics would set the line). 
26. Modem advocates of the view that limitations on the federal scope are to be 
found in political competition, without judicial intervention, include Herbert Wechsler, 
The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Se-
lection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954); Jesse H. Choper, 
Scope of the National Powers: The Dispensibility of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 
{1979); Larry Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Safeguards of Federalism, 100 
CoLUM. L. REV. 215 {2000). 
27. See, e.g., George Nichols {Federalist), Speech to the Virginia Ratification Con-
vention (June 16, 1788), in 3 ELUOT's DEBATES 443 (saying that if Congress "exceed 
these powers, the judiciary will declare it void, or else the people will have a right to de-
clare it void"); John Marshall, Speech to the Virginia Ratification Convention, (June 20, 
1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 553 (saying that judges would guard the Constitution by 
voiding Congressional acts not within enumerated powers). 
28. Civis, To the Citizens of South Carolina, CHARLEsTON COLUMBIAN HERALD 
(Feb. 4, 1788) (emphasis in the original), reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 22; 
accord A NATIVE OF VIRGINIA: OBSERVATIONS UPON TiiE PROPOSED PLAN OF TiiE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT {Apr. 2, 1787) (observing that "all taxes and imposts &care to 
be applied only for the common defence and general welfare"), reprinted in 9 
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"the idea that Congress can levy taxes at pleasure, is false and 
the suggestion wholly unsupported: ... in the very clause which 
gives the power of levying duties and taxes, the purpose to which 
the money has to be appropriated, are specified, viz. to pay the 
debts, and provide for the common defense and general wel-
fare."29 
Reading our Constitution as giving a general federal power 
to provide for the common defense and general welfare fixes the 
self-contradiction in the Framers' maintaining both that all pow-
ers must be enumerated and that some good powers need not be 
enumerated. Even a constitution cannot repair the logical con-
tradiction inherent in the insistence that enumerated powers are 
exhaustive, except when they are not. 
Reading the Constitution to find a general power to provide 
for the national necessities also rationalizes our actual interpre-
tative approach. We have stretched the necessary and proper 
clause and the commerce clause to allow the federal government 
to provide for common interests, by hook or by crook. Indeed, 
we will continue that tradition. We need, for example, to have 
the federal government when we face a nationwide epidemic of 
Ebola or some even worse new disease. We need to rein in pol-
lution on the national level, in those cases in which states or lo-
calities decide to pollute their neighbors for self-serving reasons. 
We should not need to find that either Ebola or pollution is in-
terstate "commerce." We may need to find power to draft for 
the Air Force or even a space force to provide for the common 
defense, without shoehorning a draft for a military force in air or 
space into enumerated powers to provided for a military force 
on land or a naval force on water. Reading a general power to 
provide for the common defense will replace an awkward stretch 
of words like land force into exercise of a federal military power 
that is in fact perfectly constitutional. "Common Defence and 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 655,667. 
29. NOAH WEBSTER, AN EXAMINATION INTO THE LEADING PRINCIPLES OF THE 
CONVENTION 27, reprinted in PAMPHLETS 25, 50. 
30. James Wilson, Speech to Public Meeting in Philadelphia (Oct. 6, 1787), in 13 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 339; see also JACK RAICOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS 
AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE C0NS11TUTION 143--46 (1996) (describing the impor-
tance of Wilson's speech within the entire ratification process). 
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general Welfare" explains the scope of the federal government 
that we in fact endorse. 
Reading a general power to provide for the common de-
fense and general welfare, moreover, will also control some im-
plied powers. When Jefferson wanted to legitimize the purchases 
of Louisiana and Florida, he claimed a federal power implied ei-
ther by sovereignty or by necessity that lacked any connection 
with the text of the Constitution. What power cannot be implied 
under those standards? Finding a power without any textual 
connection is the stuff of coups d'etat. Yet a coup is unnecessary 
if in fact the acquisition of new territory fits within the scope of 
common defense or the general welfare. Why resort to a nontex-
tual basis for federal action when legitimacy arises from the con-
stitutional text itself? 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT 
A. THE REMOVAL OF THE "EXPRESSLY DELEGATED" 
LIMITATION. 
In the ratification debate, the Framers commonly described 
the proposed Constitution as one giving the federal government 
only a list of specifically defined powers. The Anti-Federalists 
found the claim not credible. On the merits, the Anti-Federalist 
position is right. The Articles of Confederation had limited Con-
gress to powers "expressly delegated" to it. Framers had re-
moved the expressly delegated language from the text of the 
proposed Constitution 
1. The Claim for Enumeration 
When the Framers emerged from the secret convention that 
drafted the Constitution, they announced, almost uniformly, that 
the proposed document gave the federal government a limited 
list of defined powers. In what is probably the most important 
speech of the ratification process, James Wilson addressed a 
crowd in front of Independence Hall, where the Constitution 
had been drafted, in October 1787. Wilson argued that the states 
had plenary powers, but the federal government did not. "The 
congressional authority is to be collected, not from tacit implica-
tion," he said, "but from the positive grant expressed in the" 
proposed Constitution. The states, he argued, could have powers 
not mentioned in any document. For the federal government, 
however, "everything which is not given, is reserved. "30 
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Delegates from other states repeated the argument. Roger 
Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut reported that the 
Constitution vested some additional powers in Congress, but 
that "[t]hose powers extend only to matters respecting the com-
mon interests of the union, and are specially defined, so that the 
particular states retain their sovereignty in all other matters. "31 
Charles Pinckney told the South Carolina House that in the fed-
eral government, "no powers could be executed, or but such as 
were expressly delegated."32 In January 1788, Madison gave his 
famous version of the argument: "The powers delegated by the 
proposed Constitution to the Federal Government, are few and 
defined. Those which are to remain in the State Governments 
are numerous and indefinite."33 Federalist James Iredell told 
North Carolina, in a very Protestant mode, that every citizen 
could himself test the legitimacy of the new Congress against the 
written instrument: 
If the Congress should claim any power not given them, it 
would be as bare a usurpation as making a king in America. If 
this Constitution be adopted, it must be presumed the instru-
ment will be in the hands of every man in America, to see 
whether authority be usurped; and any person by inspecting it 
may see if the power claimed be enumerated. If it be not, he 
will know it to be a usurpation. 34 
Pinckney should not, however, has said that the Constitution 
gave Congress only the powers expressly delegated to it, because 
the Framers, as discussed next, took out the "expressly dele-
gated" limitation of the Articles of Confederation. Iradell should 
31. Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth, To The Governor Of Connecticut (Sept. 
26, 1787), in 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS99 (emphasis added). 
32. Charles Pinkney, Speech to the South Carolina House of Representatives (Jan. 
16, 1788), in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 259 (emphasis added). 
33. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 315 (Madison)(Jan. 26, 1788). Madison repeated 
the argument, in the attempt to defeat the national bank in 1791. James Madison, Debate 
in the House of Representative, 1 ANNALS 1945, 1st Cong., 3d Sess. (1791) (saying that 
the Constitution "is not a general grant, out of which, particular powers are excepted; it is 
a grant of particular powers only, leaving the general mass in other hands"); see also 
James Madison, Address to the People of Virginia (Jan. 23, 1799), in 6 MADISON 
WRITINGS 333-36: 
For the honor of American understanding, we will not believe that the people 
have been allured into the adoption of the Constitution of undefined pow-
ers .... [T]he preamble would admit a reading which would erect the will of 
Congress into a power in all cases, and therefore limited in none, [but] the ob-
jects for which the Constitution was formed were attainable only by a particular 
enumeration and specification of power granted to the Federal Government; 
reserving all others to the People, or to the States. 
34. James Iredell, Speech before the North Carolina Ratification Convention (July 
29, 1788), in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 172. 
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not have stated that inspection of the instrument would allow 
anyone to see a usurpation, because the instrument itself gave no 
foundation for the position that Congress would have only the 
powers expressly delegated to it. The Federalist descriptions of 
the enumerated powers as exhaustive, moreover, are mixed in 
with Federalist descriptions of the Constitution as giving Con-
gress general power to provide for the common defense and 
general welfare within the appropriate national sphere. 
2. The Anti-Federalists' Rebuttal 
When Thomas Jefferson first heard of James Wilson's ar-
gument that the Constitution prevented unenumerated federal 
powers, he dismissed it as a gratuitous remark: 
To say, as Mr. Wilson does that ... all is reserved in the case 
of the general government which is not given ... might do for 
the Audience to whom it was addressed, but is surely gratis 
dictim, opposed by strong inferences from the body of the in-
strument, as well as from the omission of the clause of our 
present confederation [Article II], which declared that in ex-
press terms. 35 
Given Jefferson's later position as the major advocate of the 
enumerated powers doctrine, his first reaction rejecting the 
claim is extraordinary. But his first reaction is fair to the text and 
drafting history. 
The Anti-Federalists devastated Wilson's exhaustive enu-
meration argument when it first arose. "Let us compare Wilson's 
claim that all powers not granted are reserved," said a Republi-
can in New York, "with the sense of the framers, as expressed in 
the instrument itself."36 In his first essay, Brutus noted especially 
the absence of the "expressly delegated" limitation and con-
cluded from its absence that "[t]his is as much one complete 
government as that of New York or Massachusetts [and] has as 
absolute and perfect powers to make and execute all laws."37 
Brutus also labeled Wilson's argument that all which is not given 
is reserved as "rather specious than solid." "[T]he powers 
35. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 10, 1787), in 10 
JEFFERSON PAPERS 439, 440. LATIN WORDS AND PHRASES FOR LA WYERS (B.S. Vasan 
ed., 1980) translates gratis dictim as a "voluntary statement or assertion to which a person 
may not be legally bound." ld. at 99. 
36. A Republican 1: To James Wilson, Esquire, NEW YoRK J. (Oct. 25, 1787), re-
printed in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 477,478. 
37. Brutus I, NEW YORK J. (Oct. 18, 1787), reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 411. 
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granted to the general government by this constitution," he said, 
"are complete."38 Centinel in Philadelphia said that the Constitu-
tion did not limit Congress to powers expressly delegated by 
proper authority and instead made laws of Congress paramount 
to all State authorities.39 "If this doctrine is true," said "A De-
mocratic Federalist" in Pennsylvania, "it at least ought to have 
[been] clearly expressed in the plan of government."40 Arthur 
Lee wrote in Virginia that "Mr. Wilson's sophism has no weight 
with me when he declares ... that in this Constitution we retain 
all we do not give up, because I cannot observe on what founda-
tion he has rested this curious observation."41 
The Anti-Federalists also deduced the falsity of Wilson's 
doctrine of reserved powers from the specific limitations on 
Congress found in the section that follows the grant of powers. 
Section 9 of Article I prohibits Congress, for instance, from en-
acting ex post facto laws or bills of attainder, from giving titles of 
nobility, and from limiting the importation of slaves before 1808. 
The Anti-Federalist deduced that there was no need for the ex-
press prohibitions of section 9 unless Congress had an implied 
power to do these things without the prohibitions.42 "Where is 
the power [to give of titles of nobility] expressly given to Con-
gress by the new constitution?" asked A Republican. "[I]f is not, 
[and it is not], then the exceptions must be to guard against an 
38. Brutus II, NEW YORK J. (Nov. 1, 1787), reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 524, 526. 
39. Centinel II, PHILADELPHIA FREEMAN'S J. (Oct. 24, 1787), reprinted in 13 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 457, 460; see also Cincinnatus I, To lames Wilson, Esquire, 
NEW YORK J. (Nov. 1, 1787) (arguing that the Articles said at the outset that what is not 
expressly given is reserved, but the Constitution makes no such reservation, such that the 
framers of the proposed constitution presumably did not mean to subject it to the same 
exception), reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 529, 530. 
40. A Democratic Federalist, PENNSYLVANIA HERALD (Oct. 17, 1787), reprinted in 
13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 386, 387; accord An Old Whig II, PHILADELPHIA 
GAZEITEER (Oct. 17, 1787) (arguing that the powers were not enumerated or reserved 
by the Constitution and that Congress may judge what is necessary and proper in all 
cases), reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 399, 402. 
41. Letter from George Lee Tuberville to Arthur Lee (Oct. 28, 1787), in 13 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 505,506. 
42. Letter from Thomas B. Wait to George Thatcher (Jan. 8, 1788), in 15 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 284, 285 (pointing to the prohibitions on the suspension of 
habeas corpus, ex post facto laws, bills of attainder, titles of nobility, and paymentsion 
because they are specifically prohibited); Brutus II, NEW YORK J. (Nov. 1, 1787), ("If 
everything which is not given is reserved, what propriety is there in these exceptions [no 
bill of attainder, title of nobility, etc.)?"), reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 524, 
528; Patrick Henry, Speech to the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 17, 1788), in 3 
ELUOT'S DEBATES 461 (saying that the ability of Congress to suspend habeas corpus in 
circumstances where not prohibited "destroys their doctrine" of no implied powers). 
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incidental or implied power?"43 "[P]ermit me, sir, to ask," Cin-
cinnatus asked Wilson rhetorically, 
why any saving clause was admitted into this constitution, 
when you tell us, every thing is reserved that is not expressly 
admitted? Which do we believe, sir, you or the constitution? 
The text, or the comment? If the [text], ... then implied pow-
ers were given, otherwise the exception[ s] would have been 
an absurdity. 44 
The specified limitations in section 9 of Article I also imply 
that there is no general limitation. Patrick Henry argued that the 
section 9 limits were "sole bounds intended by the American 
government. "45 Indeed, had the limitation of old Article II been 
intended, section 9 would have been the natural place to put it. 
The existence of specific limitations in section 9 is inconsistent 
with a general limitation required by the enumerated powers 
doctrine, under the same expressio unius est exclusio alterius 
maxim on which the enumerated powers doctrine must rely in 
the first place. As William Riker has argued, Wilson got what he 
deserved: sophistry in rejoinder to a sophistry.46 
3. The Removal of the "Expressly Delegated" Limitation 
The Anti-Federalists are correct that the Framers removed 
the expressly delegated limitation, with the intent to allow unex-
pressed federal powers. The Framers adopted the structure and 
much of the language of the Constitution's description of the 
powers of Congress from the preexisting fundamental charter, 
the Articles of Confederation. Article IX of the Confederation 
gave Congress a list of powers, including the power to raise and 
support an army and navy, to establish post offices, to fix weights 
and measures, to coin money, and to regulate trade with the In-
43. See, e.g., A Republican I, To James Wilson, Esquire, NEW YORK J. (Oct. 25, 
1787), reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 477, 479. Article VI of the Articles of 
Confederation also barred Congress from giving titles of nobility (19 JCC 216 (March 1, 
1781)) without a predicate enumerating that titles of nobility would be allowed without 
the bar. A Republican's conclusion that that prohibition implied a general power seems 
an invalid syllogism in the Articles, given that Article II limited Congress to powers ex-
pressly delegated. If the syllogism is invalid as to the Articles, its seems equally invalid as 
to the Constitution. 
44. Cincinnatus II, To James Wilson, Esquire, NEW YORK J. (Nov. 8, 1787), re-
printed in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 11, 12. 
45. Patrick Henry, Speech to the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 17, 1788), 
in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 461. 
46. WILLIAM RIKER, THE STRATEGY OF RHETORIC: CAMPAIGNING FOR THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 88 (1996). 
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dians.47 The Constitution carried over all of the enumerated 
powers of old Article IX and added to the enumeration. Sepa-
rately, old Article VIII allowed Congress to defray expenses "in-
curred for the common defense or general welfare" from the 
common treasury.48 The Constitution carried over the power to 
provide for the common defense and general welfare. Finally, 
Article II of the Confederation provided that each state "retains 
every Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confed-
eration expressly delegated to the ... Congress. "49--fhe Constitu-
tion did not carry over the "expressly delegated" limitation of 
old Article II. 
The Constitution evidently omitted the "expressly dele-
gated" limitation in order to allow at least one unexpressed 
power, the federal passport system. In the Virginia ratification 
convention, the Anti-Federalists challenged the omission of the 
"expressly delegated" restriction. Edmund Randolph defended 
the omission of "expressly delegated" because the limitation had 
proved to be "destructive" to the Union. Even the passport sys-
tem, Randolph said, had been challenged because it was not ex-
pressly authorized.50 
In a conflict between federal and state power under the Ar-
ticles of Confederation, which was well known at the time, the 
validity of the federal passport had been confirmed. In late 1782, 
a group of Pennsylvanians seized goods from the ship Amazon 
as enemy contraband. The Amazon was traveling under a fed-
eral passport issued by General Washington to carry supplies 
across the lines of war for British and Hessian prisoners of war 
held at Lancaster, Pennsylvania.51 Congress, led by a committee 
47. Articles of Confederation, article IX, 19 ICC 219 (March 1, 1781). 
48. I d. at 217. 
49. Id. at 214 (emphasis added). 
50. Edmund Randolph, Debate in the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 24, 
1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 600--01. Edmund Randolph had served on the five-man 
Committee of Detail at the Philadelphia Convention, see 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS 97, 
which was the committee that removed the "expressly delegated" language from the 
Constitution. Randolph's statement is a declaration against interest; it is not the kind of 
understatement of the Constitution's impact that the Federalists used to get the docu-
ment ratified. Thus it is an especially credible expression of the drafters' official intent. 
The proponents of the Constitution also wanted Congress to have unexpressed or 
implied powers to enforce requisitions by force if necessary. See, e.g., Edmund Randolph, 
Reasons for not Signing the Constitution (Dec. 27, 1787), in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
260, 263 (arguing that the absence of implied federal powers prevented the federal gov-
ernment from compelling requisitions). 
51. The seizure occurred after the provisional treaty of peace, and long after York-
town, but before the proclamation of cessation of arms. Cornwallis surrendered on Sep-
tember 19, 1781. See JAMES THOMAS FLEXNER, WASHINGTON: THE INDISPENSABLE 
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that included Madison objected to the seizure on that ground 
that the Amazon's passp<?rt had been a valid exercise of war by 
the Commander in Chief. 52 Ultimately, the Pennsylvania Legisla-
ture sought the advice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The 
Pennsylvania court and legislature concurred that the federal 
passport was valid, concluded that the Pennsylvania law requir-
ing seizure of contraband was unconstitutional as applied to the 
Amazon because the federal passport was supreme over Penn-
sylvania law, and ordered that the seized goods be returned.53 
The Pennsylvania decision is an early quasijudicial precedent es-
tablishing the enforceable supremacy of federal law over state 
law. 
Passports started as a special act of Congress for named in-
dividuals. Between 1776 and 1781, Congress issued several reso-
lutions allowing specifically identified individuals facing hardship 
to cross the lines of war54 or to bring their families and house-
MAN 461 (1969). The provisional treaty of peace was signed in Paris on November 30, 
1782, although cessation of arms was not announced by the Continental Congress until 
Aprilll, 1783.24 JCC 238. 
52. Madison Notes of the Continental Congress Debates (Jan. 24, 1783), in 19 
LEITERS OF DELEGATES 608 (reporting that a committee of Rutledge, Madison, and 
Wolcott had concluded that the power to grant passports for the feeding of the prisoners 
was inseparable from the power of war); Letter of Oliver Wolcott to Matthew Griswold, 
Jan. 22, 1783, 18 LEITERS OF DELEGATES at 601 (saying that if Pennsylvania law allows 
such an atrocious violation of the principles of the confederation, no one would trust the 
passport); John Mercer (Pa.), Debate in the Congress of the Confederation (Feb. 20, 
1783), in 3 ELUOT'S DEBATES 54. 
53. John Dickinson, Repon to the Pennsylvania General Assembly (Jan. 20, 1783), 
in MINUTES OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SEVENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 783 (reporting the conflict between the passport 
and Pennsylvania law); MINUTES OF THE SECOND SESSION OF THE SEVENTH GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 834 (Feb. 18, 1783) (resolving 
also that Pennsylvania citizens should be reimbursed for their costs because the seizure 
had been an exercise of a 1782 Pennsylvania law); Debate in Continental Congress (Feb. 
20, 1783), in 25 JCC 906, n.1 ("The Legislature in consequence having declared the law 
under which the goods were seized to be void as contradictory to the federal Constitu-
tion."); Elias Boudinot (New Jersey), Speech to the House of Representative (Feb. 4, 
1791), in 1 ANNALS 1975-1976, 1st Cong., 3d Sess. (reporting that Pennsylvania judges 
declared the confiscation invalid because Congress was given the power over passports 
with the power to declare war); James Madison, Notes of the Continental Congress De-
bates (Feb. 25, 1783), in 19 LETIERS OF DELEGATES 68 (reporting that Madison had 
been told that Pennsylvania legislature had settled the business by deciding that Pennsyl-
vania law was unconstitutional insofar as it interfered with passports). The author has not 
been able to locate the opinion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to the Pennsylvania 
legislative committee, assuming that it has survived in either the Pennsylvania State Ar-
chives in Harrisburg or the Pennsylvania Historical Society archives in Philadelphia. 
54. Resolution (May 9, 1776), in 4 JCC 341 (granting a passport to Mrs. Bellews to 
come to Philadelphia); Resolution (May 24, 1776), in 4 JCC 385 (granting a passport to 
Mrs. Grant to return to her husband in London); Resolution (May 5, 1778), in 11 JCC 
458 (granting a passport to Mrs. Prevost to return to Europe); Resolution (Apr. 25, 
1780), in 16 JCC 391 (granting a passport to allow Mrs. Ridley and family to travel from 
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hold goods from outside the United States.55 During the war, 
passports issued by Washington for provisions for prisoners of 
war fell comfortably within Article IX of the Confederation, 
which expressly allowed Congress to direct the operations of and 
to make the rules for land and naval forces. Prisoners of war are 
particularly a wartime phenomenon. Congress continued pass-
ports in peacetime, however, and the system was even expanded 
in peacetime to require passports cosigned by the Superinten-
dent for Indian Affairs for travel among the Indians. 56 
The Framers shared a norm that they were adding to con-
gressional powers, not subtracting from them.57 A congressional 
activity under the Articles such as the passport was thus legiti-
mate under the Constitution. The passport system operated con-
tinuously from the Articles to the Constitution. When the new 
Constitution came into effect, the staff of Congress's Office of 
Foreign Affairs, which handled passports, became staff in the 
State Department without interruption of activities.58 
The passport also would have been considered a legitimate 
federal activity even in peacetime because passports for foreign 
travel fell on the federal side of everyone's line between federal 
and state authority. In the drafting of the Articles of Confedera-
tion, foreign relations were conceded to be an issue of exclu-
sively federal concern, even by those who most ardently wished 
London to New York); Reference (Oct. 3, 1781), in 21 JCC 1033 (referring a proposal for 
a passport to allow Mrs. Webb to travel to Connecticut to the War Board for approval on 
the condition that the British also approve a passport). 
55. Reference (June 3, 1779), in 14 JCC 678--79 (referring to the Marine Committee 
a petition from Robert Harris to bring goods from Nova Scotia into the United States); 
Resolution (Aug. 23, 1781), in 21 JCC 906 (allowing the War Board to decide whether to 
grant a passport to Muscoe Livingston to move his family and goods from Jamaica). 
56. In 1786, Congress adopted an ordinance allowing non-United States citizens to 
travel among the Indians only with a passport approved by the Superintendent for Indian 
Affairs of the district. Ordinance for Dealing with the Indians (June 1786), in 30 JCC 371. 
57. See, e.g., James Wilson, Speech at the Federal Convention, July 14, 1787, in 2 
FARRAND'S RECORDS 10 (saying that the complaint is that Congress governed too little, 
not that it governed overmuch); Resolutions Presented to the Committee of Detail, in 2 
FARRAND'S RECORDS 131-32 (governing Virginia Plan Resolution providing that "the 
Legislature of the United States ought to possess the legislative Rights vested in Con-
gress by the Confederation; and moreover ... ") (emphasis added); Letter of James Madi-
son to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 4, 1790) in 16 JEFFERSON PAPERS 146, 150 {saying that 
attention was more toward means of strengthening the federal government than of nar-
rowing it); Sherman & Oliver Ellsworth to Governor Samuel Huntington, The Report of 
Connecticut's Delegates to the Constitutional Convention (Sept. 26, 1787), in 13 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 471 (saying that the states' principal object in authorizing the 
convention was to vest some additional powers in Congress) (emphasis added). 
58. See U.S. PASSPORT OFFICE, THE UNITED STATES PASSPORT: PAST, PREsENT, 
FuTuRE 8--9 (1976). 
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to restrain the federal government.59 In the ratification debates, 
even the Anti-Federalists conceded that "[t]hose powers respect-
ing external objects can be lodged no where else, with any pro-
priety, but in the general government. "60 The peacetime passport 
is an issue of foreign relations.61Under the enumerated powers 
doctrine, however, even a power that Congress should have, like 
the passport, needed to be enumerated. And passports were not 
on the list. 
In the Virginia ratification convention, the Anti-Federalists 
apparently accepted the necessity of an implied federal passport. 
Anti-Federalists in other states had offered an amendment to 
the proposed Constitution to return the limitation of Congress to 
"expressly delegated" powers, as in old Article II. In Virginia, 
however, the Anti-Federalists acceded to the deletion of "ex-
pressly delegated," in apparent reliance on Randolph's argument 
that if a government without unexpressed powers could not even 
issue passports. Madison, in any event, argued in the House of 
Representatives debates on the Bill of Rights that the Anti-
Federalists' failure to offer the "expressly delegated" limitation 
amounted to acquiescence in implied powers, particularly the 
passport.62 
59. See, e.g., Thomas Burke, Notes on the Articles of Confederation (Dec. 18, 1777), 
in 8 LEITERS OF DELEGATES 435 ("The United States ought to be as one Sovereign with 
respect to foreign Powers, in all things that relate to War or where the States have one 
Common Interest"); see also Letter of Thomas Burke to Governor Thomas Caswell, 
(Apr. 29, 1777), in 6 LEITERS OF DELEGATES 672 (arguing that Congress should have 
power enough to "call out the common strengths for the common defense"): See JACK N. 
RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN IN1ERPRETATIVE HISTORY OF 
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 154 (1979) (concluding that the most important powers 
and probably least controversial powers given to Congress by the Articles of Confedera-
tion were control over war and peace and diplomacy). 
60. Federal Farmer, "Letters to the Republic III," (Oct. 10, 1787), reprinted in 14 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 10, 17; see also Federal Farmer, "Letters to the Republic I" 
(Oct. 8, 1787) (arguing that to let the general government should have power extending 
to all foreign concerns, while leaving internal police of the community exclusively to the 
state), reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 24; A Farmer, PHILADELPHIA 
FREEMAN'S J., April 23, 1787 (conceding that Congress should have powers over peace, 
war, and treaties with other nations), reprinted in 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 133, 138. 
61. With exceptions during the War of 1812 and the Civil War, passports were not 
mandatory until 1918 and it was not until 1978 that passports were required by statute in 
nonemergency peacetime. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 293 n.22 (1981). By the twen-
tieth century, the Court had given the executive plenary control over foreign affairs, be-
yond any enumeration, under the doctrine of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export 
Corp., 299 U.S. 304,315-20 (1936). See Haig, 453 U.S. at 292-93. 
62. James Madison, Speech in the House of Representatives (Aug. 18, 1789), in 1 
ANNALS 790, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. (successfully resisting the insertion of the word "ex-
pressly:• i~t? the ~ent~ Amendme~t). The list of Anti-Federalist amendments in Virginia 
IS at VJrg~rua RatificatiOn Convention (June 17, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 659. The 
Massachusetts (2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 131), New York (2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 406), Mary-
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The Tenth Amendment provides that the states and the 
people shall have the powers not delegated to Congress. The 
Tenth Amendment to the Constitution was presented to Con-
gress in 1789 as a part of the Bill of Rights after the Constitution 
had been ratified by enough states to come into effect. The 
Tenth Amendment, however, apparently allows unexpressed or 
implied powers, especially the passport. The Tenth Amendment 
is a gesture toward the Anti-Federalists' objections to eliminat-
ing old Article II, which limited Congress only to powers "ex-
pressly delegated,"63 but the amendment adopted neither old 
Article II nor the Anti-Federalists' proposals. Anti-Federalists in 
Congress objected to the proposed language of the Tenth 
Amendment and argued that the word "expressly" needed to be 
inserted. Under the proposal, the Constitution would track the 
old Article II, so that Congress would be limited to only the 
powers "expressly delegated" to it. The Federalists opposed the 
insertion, arguing that it was impossible to delineate all the pow-
ers that Congress might need by implication. Madison also re-
counted the history of the passport and the absence of the "ex-
pressly delegated" amendment in the Virginia ratification 
convention as demonstrating Anti-Federalist acquiescence 
there.64 Roger Sherman, who had once advocated the enumer-
ated powers doctrine,65 argued that all corporate bodies are sup-
posed to possess the powers incident to a corporate capacity, 
even if those powers were not absolutely expressed.66 The Anti-
Federalist proposal to insert "expressly" was rejected over-
whelmingly. 
The proposed insertion was rejected, Chief Justice Marshall 
would later say, because "it would strip the government of some 
land (2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 550) and North Carolina ratification conventions (4 ELUOT'S 
DEBATES 249) recommended an amendment providing that "all powers not expressly 
delegated to Congress are reserved to the several states." 
63. See, e.g., Centinel II, PHILADELPHIA FREEMAN'S J. (Oct. 24, 1787) (objecting 
that the Constitution had not limited Congress to powers expressly delegated by proper 
authority, and had made laws of Congress paramount to all State authorities), reprinted 
in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 457, 460; Cincinnatus I, To James Wilson, Esquire, NEW 
YoRK J. (Nov. 1, 1787) (observing that the Articles said that what is not expressly given 
is reserved, but the Constitution makes no such reservation, so the presumption is that 
the framers of the proposed constitution did not mean to subject Congress to the same 
exception), reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 529, 530. 
64. August 18, 1789, 1 ANNALS 790, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 
65. July 17, 1787,2 FARRAND'S REcORDS 26 (saying that Sherman "in explanation 
of his ideas read an enumeration of powers"). 
66. 1 ANNALS 790, 1st Cong., 1st Sess.; see also August 21, 1787, in 1 ANNALS 797, 
1st Cong., 1st Sess. (reporting that Elbridge Gerry's proposal to add "expressly dele-
gated" to the Ninth Amendment was defeated, 17-32, without debate). 
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of its most essential powers. "67 "The men who drew and adopted 
[the Tenth] amendment," Marshall wrote, had "experienced the 
embarrassments resulting from the insertion of this word in the 
articles of confederation, and probably omitted it, to avoid those 
embarrassments."68 Under this interpretation, the Tenth 
Amendment allows some unexpressed or implied powers, espe-
cially the peacetime passport.69 
The peacetime passport is a significant government power. 
The passport has been described as the means by which the gov-
ernment monopolizes the legitimate means of movement of in-
dividuals, much as the government is described as monopolizing 
the legitimate means of violence.70 Patrick Henry protested that 
if the federal government could require passports b~ implication, 
it could also emancipate the slaves by implication. 1 Given how 
passports restrict movement, there is merit to Henry's argument. 
Given its significance, it is difficult to treat the peacetime pass-
port as incidental to some enumerated powers. The peacetime 
passport is not enumerated in clauses 2-17 nor reasonably ac-
commodated as a necessary and proper instrument of any of the 
specific clauses. 
The removal of the "expressly delegated" limitation also fits 
with the major purpose of the Constitution. The immediate crisis 
that caused the Constitution was the failure of the states to pay 
their requisitions and their vetoes of proposals to give the Con-
gress its own sources of revenue. The first purpose of the Consti-
tution was to give the federal government a source of revenue so 
that it could make payments on the Revolutionary War debts. 
When war came again, the Congress would have to borrow 
again. The Constitution went beyond the immediate fiscal crisis 
to form a complete national government supreme over the 
states, primarily, I have argued, because of the anger of the 
Founders at the states for their breaches of duty to the united 
cause of the Revolutionary War and the republican form of gov-
67. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,384 (1819). 
68. !d. at 406--07. 
69. See Charles A. Lofgren, The Origins of the Tenth Amendment, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 331 {Ronald Collins, ed. 1980) (explain-
ing that nothing in the Tenth Amendment undercuts the strong nationalism of the Con-
stitution). 
70. See JOHN TORPEY, THE INVENTION OF THE PASSPORT: SURVEILLANCE, 
CITIZENSHIP AND THE STATE 4 (2000). 
71. See Patrick Henry, Speech to the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 24, 
1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 446. 
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ernment. 72 As James Wilson told the Convention, "It has never 
been a complaint agst. Congs. that they governed overmuch. The 
complaint has been that they have governed too little."73 Or as 
Madison had to remind Jefferson, "The evils suffered and feared 
from weakness in Government have turned the attention more 
toward the means of strengthening the [government] than of 
narrowing [it]."74 The Framers removed the "expressly dele-
gated" limitation and did not replace it because limitation of the 
federal government was not the problem that needed to be ad-
dressed. 
While the Framers removed the "expressly delegated" limi-
tation, they also did not seem to want a federal government su-
preme over the states as to purely local issues. As argued in the 
next section, the principle was apparently that the federal gov-
ernment would have power over appropriately national issues, 
but would leave non-national issues to the states. That principle 
seems to have been embodied in the language of Article I, sec-
tion 8, clause 1, which empowers Congress to provide for the 
common defense and general welfare. The peacetime passport is 
a helpful and proper instrument to advance the common defense 
or the national welfare, akin, for instance, to the expressed pow-
ers over naturalization of citizens and the power to make treaties 
with foreign nations.75 
4. Federalist Nonexhaustive Descriptions 
Mixed in with the Federalist descriptions of the enumera-
tion as exhaustive are Federalists' representations that the fed-
eral government would have a general power to address national 
needs or that the federal sphere would be defined by political 
competition in the future. John Jay's Address to the People of 
New York, which was described as having an "astonishing influ-
ence in converting Antifederalists,"76 promised the people of 
72. CALVIN H. JOHNSON, RIGH'IEOUS ANGER AT THE WICKED STATES: THE 
MEANING OF THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION (2005). 
73. James Wilson, Speech at the Federal Convention, July 14, 1787, in 2 
FARRAND'S RECORDS 10. 
74. Letter of James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 4, 1790), in 16 JEFFERSON 
PAPERS 146,150; see also Roger Sherman & Oliver Ellsworth to Governor Samuel Hunt-
ington, The Report of Connecticut's Delegates to the Constitutional Convention (Sept. 26, 
1787), in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 471 (saying that the states' principal object in au-
thorizing the convention was to vest some additional powers in Congress). 
75. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8 (naturalization), cl. 4; id. art. II,§ 2, c. 2 (treaties). 
76. Letter from Samuel Webb to Joseph Barrell (April 27, 1788), quoted in Edito-
rial Note, 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 101, 103; see also sources cited in Editorial Note, 
id. at 101, 107. Editor John Kaminski also calls the John Jay address far more important 
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New York that "the Convention concurred in opinion with the 
people that a national government competent to every national 
object, was indispensably necessary."77 Oliver Ellsworth told the 
Connecticut convention that the Constitution was based on the 
"the necessity of combining our whole force, and, as to national 
purposes, becoming one state."78 Abraham Baldwin of Georgia 
described the Convention as unanimous in believing that a fed-
eral government "should comprehend all Things of common 
foederal Concern."79 James Wilson described the Constitution to 
Pennsylvania Ratification Convention as giving Congress what-
ever objects of government extend "beyond the bounds of a par-
ticular state" and while there was an enumeration of powers, he 
said, "It is only in mathematical science that a line can be de-
scribed with mathematical precision."80 As noted, moreover, 
both Madison and Hamilton argued that the division between 
the federal and state governments was a legislative or political 
question that would be set in the future by competition between 
those governments for the loyalty of the people. Descriptions of 
the Constitution as giving general national powers or leaving the 
limitations to future politics existed side by side with representa-
tions that the enumerated powers were exhaustive. 
B. THE TEXTUAL CASE FOR A GENERAL 
NATIONAL POWER 
The best reading of the text of the Constitution is that it 
grants to the federal government a general power to provide for 
the common defense and general welfare. In a supposedly bind-
ing resolution, the Convention directed its drafting committees 
to grant Congress all the powers it had under the Articles of 
Confederation, plus the power "to legislate in all Cases for the 
general interests of the Union." The Constitution took the 
phrase, "to provide for the common Defence and general Wel-
fare," from the Articles of Confederation both to maintain con-
than The Federalist in getting New York to ratify. John Kaminski, New York: The Reluc-
tant Pillar, in 1iiE RELUCTANT PILLAR: NEW YORK AND THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 72 (Stephen L. Schechter ed., 1985). 
77. A Citizen of New York (John Jay), Address to the People of the State of New 
York (April15, 1787), in 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 101, 111 (emphasis in original). 
78. Oliver Ellsworth, Debate in the Connecticut Ratification Convention (Jan. 4, 
1787) in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 186 (emphasis added). 
79. Ezra Stiles, Diary (Dec. 21, 1787), in 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS 168-{)9. 
80. James Wilson, Speech to the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (Nov. 26, 
1787), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 424-25. 
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tinuity with the Articles and to maintain loyalty to the governing 
resolution. 
1. The Bedford Resolution 
We know a fair amount about the drafting of the Constitu-
tion, both from its inputs and end product and from the notes, 
best of all Madison's, kept on the debates at the Convention. 
The Convention proceedings were kept secret to encourage un-
cowered debate, and the records of the debates were not pub-
lished until long after ratification.81 Once he became a Jefferson-
ian, Madison claimed that interpretation should resolve textual 
ambiguities by looking solely to the ratification conventions 
which ratified the Constitution and not to the secret Convention, 
which merely proposed a draft.82 But Madison did not hesitate to 
cite the Convention for his own side in a partisan debate, even 
when the conclusion he drew from the secret proceedings was 
highly contestable.83 
81. The Rules of the Federal Convention provided that "nothing spoken [within the 
convention] be printed, or otherwise published, or communicated without leave." Rules 
of the Federal Convention, May 29, 1787, 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS 17 (Madison notes). 
The sparse Journal was published in 1819 and Madison's Notes were not published until 
1840. 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS at xi-xi~ xv. 
82. James Madison, Speech in the House of Representatives (Apr. 6, 1796), in 3 
FARRAND'S RECORDS 374 (saying that if we were to look "for the meaning of the in-
strument beyond the face of the instrument, we must look for it, not in the General Con-
vention, which proposed the Constitution, but in the State Conventions which accepted 
and ratified it); see also Letter from James Madison to Thomas Ritchie (Sept. 15, 1821), 
in 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS 447-48: 
As a guide in expounding and applying the provisions of the Constitution, the 
debates and incidental decisions of the Convention can have no authoritative 
character. However desirable it be that they should be preserved as a gratifica-
tion to the laudable curiosity felt by every people to trace the origin and pro-
gress of their political Institutions, and as a source perhaps of some lights on the 
Science of Government the legitimate meaning of the Instrument must be de-
rived from the text itself; or if a key is to be sought elsewhere, it must be not in 
the opinions or intentions of the Body which planned and proposed the Consti-
tution, but in the sense attached to it by the people in their respective State 
Conventions where it recorded all the authority which it possesses. 
83. Compare James Madison, Speech in the House of Representatives (Feb. 2, 
1791), in 1 ANNALS 1896, 1st Cong., 2d Sess. (using the Convention's rejection of a ex-
press power to grant charters of incorporation to deny congressional power to charter the 
national bank) with Letter of James Madison to Professor Davis (1832), 3 FARRAND's 
RECORDS 520 (concluding that protective tariffs were allowed even if a specific authori-
zation was defeated in the Convention because the failure to adopt the power might have 
occurred because the motion was in a bad form or not in order;; because it blended other 
powers with the particular power in question; or because the object had been, or would 
be, elsewhere provided for); cf. Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of 
a National Bank (Feb 23, 1791), 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS 364 (arguing that no inference 
could be drawn from failure to enumerate because some thought it unnecessary to spec-
ify the power, and inexpedient to give another target for objecting to the Constitution). 
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My own posture is that every scrap of available historical 
evidence should be used to shed light and resolve ambiguities. 
The best defense against counterfeited or manipulated evidence 
is more evidence. To distinguish between prevailing and de-
feated minority views, we should carefully marshal all the evi-
dence. I also think that we learn more about the logic of the 
Constitution by asking the delegates to the Convention who 
wrote it, much as we learn about the logic of Porsche by asking 
the engineers who designed it. Both the people who ratified the 
Constitution and a buyer of a Porsche are sovereign, and they 
can reject the whole. It is just that neither "sovereign" knows 
very much about the internal mechanism of a Porsche or the in-
ternal logic of the Constitution. 
The actual language of the Constitution was drafted by a se-
ries of committees, which were instructed to draft langua~ 
"conformable to the Resolutions passed by the Convention." 
The drafting committees were not to effect policy, Washington 
wrote in his dairy, but to "arrange, and draw into method & 
form the several matters which had been agreed to by the Con-
vention."85 The role of the drafting committees, alternatively 
stated, was to ensure that the Constitution was "properly 
dressed."86 The first drafting committee was called the "Commit-
tee of Detail," denominating that its authorization was confined 
to details. 
The binding resolution on the scope of the federal govern-
ment was a version of the Virginia Plan, as augmented by a mo-
tion offered by Gunning Bedford of Delaware. Bedford's resolu-
tion gave Congress all the powers it had under the Articles of 
Confederation and authorized Congress further "to legislate in 
all cases for the general interests of the Union."87 The full scope 
of the federal power under the governing resolution of the Con-
vention, as augmented by the Bedford's motion, was that "the 
Legislature of the United States ought to possess the legislative 
Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation; and moreover 
84. July 24, 1787, in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS l(J6. 
85. George Washington, Diary (July 27, 1787), in 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS 65 
86. Letter from Hugh Williamson to James Iredell (July 22, 1787), in 3 FARRAND'S 
RECORDS61. 
87. Gunning Bedford, Motion of July 17, 1787,2 FARRAND'S RECORDS 26. 
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to legislate in all Cases for the general Interests of the Union, 
and also in those Cases to which the States are separately in-
competent, or in which the Harmony of the United States may 
be interrupted by the Exercise of individual Legislation Resolu-
tion. "88 
Some participants at the Convention favored an exhaustive 
listing or enumeration of the powers of Congress, but they seem 
to have lost in the votes on the Bedford Resolution. John 
Rutledge of South Carolina called for an enumeration of powers 
early in the Convention,89 and South Carolina voted against both 
the Bedford Resolution and the whole Virginia Plan once the 
Bedford Resolution was added. Roger Sherman had spoken in 
favor of an enumeration90 and Connecticut voted against the 
Bedford Resolution, but then voted for the whole Virginia Plan 
once the Bedford Resolution was added. Late in the Conven-
tion, when the language was in place, Edmund Randolph and 
George Mason of Virginia objected that the Constitution ~ave 
the national government general powers of indefinite extent. 1 A 
majority of the Virginia delegation voted against the Bedford 
Resolution, but then voted for the full language of the Virginia 
Plan as amended by the Bedford Resolution. Overall, the Bed-
ford amendment passed six states to four2 and the full Virginia 
Plan as amended by the Bedford Resolution then passed b,X 
eight to two, with only South Carolina and Georgia dissenting. 
As far as we can tell from the surviving evidence, the exhaustive 
enumeration argument remained a minority position behind the 
closed doors of the Convention. 
The first of the drafting committees, the Committee of De-
tail, adopted the structure of the Articles of Confederation as a 
model. The Committee of Detail brought all of the powers enu-
merated in old Article IX into Article I, section 8 of the Consti-
tution, and added some more powers, but it omitted old Article 
II's limitation that confined Congress to powers expressly dele-
gated to it. None of the surviving early drafts offered to the 
88. Resolutions Presented to the Committee of Detail, in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS 
131-32. 
89. May 31, 1787, 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS 53. 
90. July 17,1787,2 FARRAND'S RECORDS 26. 
91. See infra text accompanying notes 107-112. 
92. Id. at 27. Connecticut, Virginia, South Carolina, and Georgia were the dissent-
ing states. 
93. /d. 
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Committee of Detail by Edmund Randolph and James Wilson 
contained the expressly delegated limitation.94 
The phrase "to provide for the common Defence and gen-
eral Welfare" in the Constitution's description of the powers of 
Congress comes from Article VIII of the Articles of Confedera-
tion, which allowed Congress to charge expenses for the com-
mon defense and general welfare to the common treasury. The 
phrase was added to Constitution on September 4, very late in 
the Convention, by a committee of Eleven, chaired by David 
Bready of New Jersey, after the enumerated powers structure of 
what became clause 2-18 was already in place.95 The phrase took 
the place of the term, "necessities of the Union," in Randolph's 
earlier draft presented to the Committee of Detail. Randolph's 
draft had provided that the Congress would have the power to 
"raise money by taxation, unlimited as to sum, for the past or fu-
ture debts and necessities of the union."96 The resolutions author-
izing the Convention, moreover, had told the Convention to de-
vise such provisions "as shall appear to them necessary to render 
the constitution of the Federal Government adequate to the exi-
gencies of the Union. "97 The enabling congressional resolution 
described the Convention's mission that of making proposals to 
render the federal Constitution "adequate to the exigencies of 
Government and the preservation of the Union."98 In context, 
moreover, "to provide for the common Defence and general 
Welfare" is a plausible synonym for the Bedford Resolution, 
which the drafting committees were supposed to follow, that 
Congress would have the power "to legislate in all cases for the 
general interests of the Union." The final phrase, "for the com-
mon Defence and general Welfare of the United States," is a 
plausible synonym for "necessities," exigencies," or "general in-
terests" of the Union. 
The "common Defence and general Welfare" language had 
appeared earlier than the Bready Report of September 4 in a 
motion that the Convention had defeated. On August 25, 1787, 
Roger Sherman of Connecticut proposed to add to the tax clause 
in what became Article I, section 8, clause 1, the language "for 
94. 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS 129-75. 
95. ld. at 497. 
96. 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS 142 (emphasis added). 
97. Report of the Commissioners assembled at Annapolis Convention, 31 JCC 680 
(Sept. 20, 1786) (emphasis added) 
98. 32 JCC 74 (Feb. 21, 1787) (emphasis added). 
52 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 22:25 
the payment of said debts and for the defraying of the expences 
that shall be incurred for the common defence and general wel-
fare. "99 The Convention had just adopted a Randolph motion 
that debts would be "as valid against the United States under the 
Constitution, as under the Confederation, "100 which survived to 
become Article VI, clause 1 of the Constitution. Sherman's mo-
tion was overwhelmingly defeated, one state for and ten states 
against apparently because it was "unnecessary" insofar as the 
first half, tying tax to the payment of existing Confederation 
debts, had just been established by the Randolph motion. Madi-
son in 1830 said that the Bready insertion would never have 
happened but for the connection with old debts. 101 But the 
Sherman motion had two halves, one for tax to pay past debts 
and one for tax to pay future expenses for the common defense 
and general welfare. The second, independent half of the motion 
says that taxes are to provide for the common defense and gen-
eral welfare in the future. In any event, something must have 
been attractive about the Sherman language, notwithstanding 
the overwhelming defeat of his motion, because Sherman's mo-
tion, with the unnecessary first half dropped, became the Brearly 
Committee's addition on September 4. 
Using language from the Articles instead of a synonymous 
phrase, such as "necessities," "exigencies," or "general interests" 
of the Union, was apparently a way of maintaining continuity 
with the Articles of Confederation. The Virginia Plan Resolu-
tion had said that the Congress would possess all the legislative 
rights vested in Congress by the Confederation, plus new 
rights102 and the Framers' general perception was that they were 
adding to the Congress's existing power.103 Madison used conti-
nuity to justify one of the most dramatic changes brought about 
by the Consitution, that is, giving Congress its own power to tax. 
In Federalist No. 45, Madison said that "[t]he change relating to 
taxation, may be regarded as the most important" of the Consti-
tution, but that "the present Congress [has] as compleat author-
ity to require of the States indefinite supplies of money for the 
99. 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS414 (emphasis added). 
100. ld. 
101. See Letter from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson (Nov. 17, 1830), in 3 
FARRAND'S RECORDS 485-86 and 2 THE FOUNDERS' CoNSTITUTION 454. 
102. Resolutions Presented to the Committee of Detail, in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS 
131-32. 
103. See, e.g., James Wilson, Speech at the Federal Convention, July 14, 1787, in 2 
FARRAND'S RECORDS 10 ("It has never been a complaint agst. Congs. that they gov-
erned overmuch. The complaint has been that they have governed too little."). 
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common defence and general welfare. "104 The phrase, "common 
Defence and general Welfare," Madison later said, was copied 
from the "the terms of the old Confederation"105 and the "simi-
larity in the use of these phrases in the two great federal char-
ters, might well be considered, as rendering their meaning less 
liable to be misconstrued."106 Choosing "common Defence and 
general Welfare" instead of the synonymous language of the 
Bedford Resolution, "general interests of the Union" served the 
important goal of maintaining continuity. 
When the description of the federal powers was complete, 
George Mason and Edmund Randolph of Virginia both argued 
that the Constitution had gone too far in giving the federal gov-
ernment a general power. In August 1787, George Mason 
wanted alterations so that "the object of the National Govern-
ment, [would] be expressly defined, instead of indefinite power, 
under an arbitrary Constitution of general clauses."107 Mason's 
objections tell us that he thought that the Committee of Detail 
had not avoided "general clauses" in favor of an enumeration.108 
After the Brearly Committee added the phrase "to provide for 
the common Defence and general Welfare" to clause 1, Gover-
nor Edmund Randolph refused to sign the Constitution because 
of "the latitude of the general powers"109 and because the "cover 
of general words" allowed the Congress to swallow up the 
states.110 Randolph ultimately reversed his position and sup-
104. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 314 (Madison) (Jan. 26, 1788) (emphasis altered). 
105. Letter from James Madison to Joseph C. Cabell (Oct. 30, 1828), in 9 MADISON 
WRITINGS 324, 325. 
106. James Madison, Repon of 1800 on the Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 7, 1800), in 17 
MADISON PAPERS 303, 313; accord Roger Sherman & Oliver Ellsworth to Governor 
Samuel Huntington, The Repon of Connecticut's Delegates to the Constitutional Conven-
tion (Sept. 26, 1787), in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 470, 471 ("[T)he objects for which 
Congress may apply monies are the same mentioned in the eighth article of the confed-
eration, viz for the common defence and general welfare."). 
107. George Mason, Alterations Proposal (Aug. 31, 1787), in SUPPLEMENT TO MAx 
FARRAND'S THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 25 (James H. Hutson ed., 
1987). 
108. Mason objected to plural "clauses" and the "necessary and proper" clause is 
plausible candidate as another general clause to which Mason was objecting. See, e.g., 
Edmund Randolph, Speech in the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 10, 1788), in 3 
ELLIOT's DEBATES 206 (referring to the "necessary and proper" clause as the "much 
dreaded sweeping clause"). 
109. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 10 
MADISON PAPERS 205,215. 
110. Edmund Randolph, Reasons for Not Signing the Constitution (Dec. 27, 1787), in 
8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 260, 273. 
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ported the Constitution. Randolph said he was strongly in favor 
of preservation of the Union,m and when it came down to this 
Constitution or nothing, he defended the document as ably as 
anyone else. 112 Still, until he changed his mind on the overall is-
sue of avoiding disunion, he opposed the Constitution because 
he believed it gave a general power. Mason and Randolph, at 
least, thought the text of the Constitution provided a general 
federal power rather than an exclusive enumeration. 
A recent commentator has argued that the Committee of 
Detail shifted the Constitution toward less federal power and 
away from the supposedly binding resolutions.113 A better read-
ing of the evidence, however, is that tbe final language carried 
out the mandate of the Bedford Resolution, at least once the 
Brearly Committee had brought the phrase, "to provide for the 
common Defence and general Welfare," over from the Articles. 
With that addition, the Constitution's text does seem to allow 
the federal government to "legislate in all cases for the general 
interests of the Union," as the Bedford Resolution had allowed. 
A consensus in principle that the federal government should 
have powers appropriate to the exigencies of the Union, how-
ever, does not imply a consensus as to what fell appropriately 
within that national sphere. When the Convention debated re-
strictions on slavery on August 22, 1787, for example, Abraham 
Baldwin of Georgia protested he had conceived that "only na-
tional objects were before the Convention" and that slavery was 
of a local nature: "Georgia was decided on this point. "114 Bald-
win assumed the principle that national objects were under con-
sideration. The specific question of whether slavery was a local 
or a national issue, as it turned out, would be settled only by civil 
war. 
111. See, e.g., Edmund Randolph, Speeches to the Virginia Ratification Convention 
(June 6, 9, 10, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 65-71,188-94,194-207. 
112 See also, e.g. Edmund Randolph, Speeches to the Virginia Ratification Conven-
tion (June 24, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 6()()..{)1 (defending the deletion of the "ex-
pressly delegated" limitation so as, for instance, to protect the passport); (June 10, 1788), 
in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 206 (defending the necessary and proper clause). 
113. See John C. Hueston, Altering the Course of the Constitutional Convention: The 
Role of the Committee of Detail in the Balance of State and Federal Powers, 100 YALE L.J. 
765 (1990). 
114. Abraham Baldwin, Speech to the Federal Convention (Aug, 22, 1788), in 2 
FARRAND'S RECORDS 372. 
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2. Canals and Incorporation 
On the third to last day of the three-and-half month assem-
bly, the Convention discussed whether to add more powers to 
the enumeration. It voted not to. It is difficult to see which way 
the discussion cuts, however, because the discussion is consistent 
with an exhaustive enumeration and with a view that added 
enumerations were unnecessary because powers were already 
implied. 
On September 14, 1787, Benjamin Franklin proposed to add 
a power to cut canals to clause 7, which allows Congress to build 
post roads and post offices.115 Roger Sherman of Connecticut 
objected that "[t]he expence in such cases will fall on the U-
States, and the benefit accrue to the places where the canals may 
be cut."116 Sherman's objection implies that he thought that ca-
nals were not within the national sphere even under a general 
welfare standard. Madison then wanted an enlargement of the 
motion so it would allow Congress to grant charters of incorpo-
ration. Rufus King of Massachusetts thought a federal power to 
incorporate would raise prejudiced and partisan objections: "In 
Philada. & New York, It will be referred to the establishment of 
a Bank, which has been a subject of contention in those Cities. In 
other places it will be referred to mercantile monopolies. "117 The 
Convention defeated the canals proposal by three states to eight. 
It never considered the apparently more controversial questions 
of enumerating the incorporation of banks and mercantile mo-
nopolies. 118 
It is probable that the federal government already had the 
power to incorporate banks and mercantile monopolies and to 
pay for canals even without the proposed changes. It was a con-
sensus that Congress would have all of the powers it had had un-
der the Articles, plus some new ones. During the Confederation, 
Congress had authorized the incorporation of a bank, the Na-
tional Bank of North America, driven by the dire necessity of 
paying the Continental Army.119 If a bank could be implied un-
115. Motion of Benjamin Franklin (Sept. 14, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS 615. 
116. /d. 
117. /d. The controvery over the Philadelphia-based Bank of North America is dis-
cussed, for example, in Pauline Maier, The Revolutionary Origins of the American Cor-
poration, 50 WM. & MARY Q. (3d Ser) 51,66-67 (1999). 
118. /d. 
119. December 31, 1781, in 21 JCC 1186--90. Madison acquiesced, apparently be-
cause the desperate needs of the war overcame any doubts about congressional power. 
Editorial note, in 4 MADISON PAPERS 21. Janet Reisman, Money, Credit and Federalist 
Political Economy, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND 
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der the Articles, which had an "expressly delegated" limit, it 
could be implied under the Constitution, which had none. 
George Mason claimed on September 14 that Congress did not 
have the power to grant mercantile monopolies, but on the next 
day, he objected that Congress did have the power and tried to 
get an amendment to restrict it. 120 Thus his final interpretation 
beyond his tactical claim was that the Constitution did include 
the power to grant mercantile monopolies. 
The Continental Congress had also paid for maps and sur-
veys, which are at least precursors to public works projects such 
as canals.121 Congress would have probably paid for more maps 
and surveys if it had the money.12 As noted, the Framers seem 
to have understood that they were adding to the powers of Con-
gress so that an activity undertaken under the Confederation 
was a precedent for an activity under the Constitution. The lan-
guage of the Constitution that was about to be released for rati-
fication allowed taxation for the general welfare, just as the Ar-
ticles had allowed projects for the general welfare. The final 
language thus allowed canals, if canals were sufficiently "gen-
eral" in impact (notwithstanding Sherman's objection that the 
benefits would be too local). 
If Congress did already have the proposed powers, then the 
September 14 debate about adding them to the list merely in-
volved political appearances. The proponents were seeking to 
promote the proposals while the opponents decided not to pub-
licize the activities unnecessarily because they were potentially 
controversial. Alexander Hamilton argued later that some 
thought it "unnecessary to specify the power, and inexpedient to 
AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 128, 138--49 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987) has a 
fine description of Robert Morris's plans and the far more modest results that the Bank 
of North America was able to achieve. 
120. 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS 631 (objecting to Congress's power by bare majority to 
give a monopoly to American ships for the transportation of American commodities on 
the ground that it would allow "a few rich merchants in Philada N. York & Boston, to 
monopolize the Staples of the Southern States & reduce their value perhaps 50 Per Ct"). 
121. July 25,1777, in 8 JCC 580; July 11, 1781, in 20 JCC 738 (appointing a "Geogra-
pher of the United States" to survey the roads and to take sketches of the country and 
the seat of war); May 20, 1785, in 28 JCC 375 (ordering that the land north of the Ohio 
River be surveyed, mapped, and broken down into plots). 
122. October 23, 1783, in 25 JCC 711 (reporting that a map of the middle states 
would be much desired, but that "such a work cannot in prudence be undertaken at the 
public expence in the present reduced state of our finances"); accord Letter of Rufus 
King to George Washington, (June 18, 1786), in 23 LETIERS OF DELEGATES 364 (report-
ing that the treasury board had declared its "utter inability to make [a] pitiful Advance" 
of $1,000 to transport ammunition to American posts along the Ohio River). 
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furnish an additional topic of objection to the Constitution."123 
That interpretation of the September 14 debate is consistent 
with the expectation that Congress had a general power to pro-
vide for common interests. Under this interpretation, listing 
those powers was not especially important and defeat of the 
proposals deprived Congress of nothing. 
On the other hand, the September 14 debate might be read 
as showing that the debaters took the enumeration seriously and 
that it mattered. Even if the proposals were justified under an 
existing enumerated power, then enumeration could still matter. 
James Wilson argued that the power to establish mercantile mo-
nopolies was already included in "the power to regulate 
trade." 124 On the same day, Madison and Pinckney proposed a 
federal power "to establish an University." Govemeur Morris of 
Pennsylvania said that he did not think that listing was necessary 
since the federal government already had the power to establish 
a university under its power to establish a capital city.125 The mo-
tion to enumerate the power to establish a university was de-
feated four states to six, with one divided. 126 If the motions for 
additions to the enumeration were defeated because another 
enumeration already allowed them, then the defeats, even if of 
powers Congress already had, would be consistent with an exclu-
sive enumeration. Of course, just because Wilson and Morris 
used other enumerated clauses to conclude that no new expres-
sion would be needed does not mean that either of them would 
have been unwilling to find an implied power in absence of an 
enumeration. 
In the end, the defeat of the September 14 proposals is con-
sistent with both a general federal power and exhaustive enu-
meration. If Congress had the powers over canals and incorpora-
tion without enumeration, then the September 14 vote defeating 
the additions can be understood, consistent with that premise, as 
a decision not to stir up the waters for no purpose. If Congress 
did not have the powers without the rejected additions, then the 
September 14 discussion can be understood as consistent with 
the premise that enumeration was necessary. Evidence consis-
tent with both interpretations does not help resolve a conflict be-
tween them. 
123. Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank (Feb. 
23,1791), in 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS364. 
124. 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS 615 (Madison's Notes). 
125. /d. at 616. 
126. Id. 
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A fair reading of the text and history of the document, in 
any event, encourages an interpretation that the text of the 
adopted Constitution allows a general power to provide for the 
common defense and general welfare. At a minimum, we may 
take from the drafting history of the Constitution that Congress 
was to have all of the powers it had under the Articles of Con-
federation plus some new powers. Whatever the Articles meant 
by "common defense and general welfare," so means the Consti-
tution. But the "expressly delegated" limitation did not appear 
in the Constitution. Therefore in the Constitution, unlike in the 
Articles, not everything about federal power had to be written 
down. 
3. The Settlement of McCulloch 
In the 1819 case of McCulloch v. Maryland,127 the Supreme 
Court endorsed the doctrine of limited or enumerated power. 
"This government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumer-
ated powers," Chief Justice John Marshall said, and "[t]he prin-
ciple, that it can exercise only the powers granted to it, [is] now 
universally admitted. "128 Marshall's opinion settled the course of 
constitutional law. The exhaustive enumerated powers argument 
is now settled doctrine. 
McCulloch, however, simultaneously interpreted the neces-
sary and proper clause expansively to allow Congress room to 
achieve national goals. In the ratification debate, the Anti-
Federalists argued, for example, that the necessary and proper 
clause would allow Congress to undertake "any power Congress 
may please."129 Madison responded that the necessary and 
proper clause could not extend the government beyond the 
enumerated clauses, 2-17. The necessary and proper clause, he 
said: 
gives no supplementary power, [but] only enables them to 
execute the delegated powers. If the delegation of their pow-
ers be safe, no possible inconvenience can arise from this 
clause. It is at most but explanatory. For when any power is 
127. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
128. Id. at 405. 
129. George Mason, Speech in the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 16, 1788), 
in 3 ELLIOT's DEBATES 442; see also John Tyler, Speech in the Virginia Ratification 
Convention (June 17, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 455 (arguing that Congress by the 
necessary and proper clause may call in foreign troops to declare a king). 
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given, its delegation necessarily involves authority to make 
laws to execute it.130 
McCulloch v. Maryland agreed that the necessary and proper 
clause allowed only instruments for enumerated goals, but then 
interpreted "necessary" as an indulgent test, more akin to "ap-
propriate and helpful" than to strict necessity.131 Marshall held 
that Congress could charter a national bank, even though char-
tering was not an enumerated power, because the bank was an 
instrument "necessary and proper" to the great powers given to 
Congress.132 "Let the end be ... within the scope of the constitu-
tion," Chief Justice Marshall said, "and all means which are ap-
propriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not 
prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the consti-
tution, are constitutional."133 
A national bank is a convenient thing to produce a con-
trolled supply of government debt that can be used as currency, 
to facilitate government borrowing, and to coordinate the collec-
tion of taxes, but it is not an enumerated power. Madison had 
argued when the bank bill was debated that the necessary and 
proper clause could not stretch to allow a bank: 
If implications thus remote and thus multiplied can be linked 
together, a chain may be formed that will reach every object 
of legislation, everv object within the whole compass of the 
l . . l 134 po rtlca economy. 
Jefferson found no credible connection between the national 
bank and any of the enumerated clauses. 135 The bank could not 
have been an exercise of a taxation power, Jefferson argued, or 
its origin in the Senate would have condemned it. 136 
130. James Madison, Speech in the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 16, 1788), 
in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 438. 
131. Cf. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689 (1966) (interpreting the "ordi-
nary and necessary" standard for tax deductions for business expenses as meaning "ap-
propriate and helpful" for the development of taxpayer's business.) 
132. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421. Madison had said that Congress had no power to 
charter corporations and that Congress claiming the power might use it to charter reli-
gious or manufacturing corporations. James Madison, The Bank Bill, Speech to the House 
of Representatives {Feb. 2, 1791), 13 MADISON PAPERS 372, 375. The Court's resolution 
of McCulloch did not give Congress a general power to charter, but only a power to char-
ter as a tool for its enumerated powers. 
133. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at421 
134. James Madison, Speech in the House of Representatives, Feb. 3, 1791, 1 
ANNALS 1949, 1st Cong., 3d Sess .. 
135. Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for Establishing a 
National Bank (Feb. 15, 1791), in 19 JEFFERSON PAPERS 275,276. 
136. /d. U.S. CON ST. art. I, § 7 cl. 1 requires that all bills for raising revenue must 
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Marshall, by the time of McCulloch, operated in a world 
very different from the fervent nationalism of 1787-88 when the 
Constitution was adopted. Jefferson consistently sought to con-
fine the federal government to foreign issues alone and to favor 
the state because, he claimed, the states gave "the surest balance 
against anti-republican tendencies. "137 By 1819, the Federalists 
had shrunk to permanent minority status and were about to be 
extinguished as a political organization. The Jeffersonians were 
in full power. Marshall, the last of the great Virginia Federalists, 
was trying to persuade Jeffersonian Justices to join him in a Jef-
fersonian political world. 
In United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 138 decided seven 
years before McCulloch, the Supreme Court speaking through a 
Jeffersonian majority had already denied that there were federal 
common law crimes, saying that the "powers of the general Gov-
ernment are made up of concessions from the several states-
what is not expressly given to the former, the latter expressly re-
serve."139 Hudson and Goodwin's expression of enumerated 
powers is hard Jeffersonian ideology hard to maintain as a mat-
ter of original constitutional history,i40 but it is a precedent that 
the majority of Marshall's colleagues would not renounce. Mar-
shall's opinion in McCulloch is cunning politics in a very differ-
ent world from the one in which the Constitution was adopted. 
Marshall in McCulloch conceded the high Jeffersonian principle 
that the federal government had only enumerated powers, but 
then approved the national bank, the specific program that the 
Jeffersonians had condemned. Marshall's decision also avoided 
facing the Jeffersonian Congress and presidency because the de-
cision merely denied a lawsuit and was self-executing. Madison 
criticized Marshall's decision not because the enumeration was 
inadequate for the national concerns, which Madison felt 
strongly in 1787,141 but because Marshall gave too much discre-
originate in the House of Representatives. 
137. Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (March 4, 1801), in BASIC 
JEFFERSON 641. 
138. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812) (Johnson, William, J); see; BRUCE ACKERMAN, 
THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 233-40 (2005), Gery Rowe, The Sound of 
Silence, 101 YALE L.J. 919,936-39 (1992). 
139. /d. at 33. 
140. Justice Johnson's opinion ignores that the Constitution had taken out the "ex-
pressly delegated" limitation of the Articles, that the Continental Congress preceded the 
states in time and did not derive its authority from the states , that the Tenth Amend-
ment had rejected the "expressly" requirement and left power ambiguously either to the 
people or to the states. 
141. See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Sept. 6, 1787), in 10 
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tion to Congress to determine what means are necessary and 
proper.142 Madison had changed, the world had changed, and 
Marshall adapted. 
A federal government limited to the enumerated powers is 
a limited government. Indeed, a federal government limited to 
providing for the common defense and general welfare by any 
necessary and proper means is also a limited government. With a 
broad enough reading of the necessary and proper clause, how-
ever, the government has powers to satisfy the common inter-
ests. Still, under Marshall's resolution of the issue, the implied 
powers allowed by the rejection of "expressly delegated" must 
fall within the scope of the "necessary and proper" clause. If we 
could go back to the fork and take the other path, there is sup-
port in the traditional values and constitutional text to allow the 
federal government to provide for the common defense and 
general welfare by any means. That path would require less lin-
guistic twisting. Still, as long as the necessary and proper clause 
is properly read to allow activities for advancing common inter-
ests, the enumerated powers doctrine that Marshall adopted 
does little harm. 
C. GENERAL WELFARE WITHIN AND OUTSIDE OF TAX 
Both Jefferson and Madison contended in their battles with 
the Federalists that the Constitution did not authorize tax and 
spending justified only by the common defense and general wel-
fare. The better reading of the text, however, is that tax is not 
confined to the enumerated powers. Indeed, the Framers would 
have drawn no viable distinction between taxation and regula-
tion, once taxation is allowed. The best reading of the text, ac-
cording, allows Congress to provide for the common defense and 
general welfare by any means. 
MADISON PAPERS 163--64 ("I hazard an opinion ... that the plan, should it be adopted, 
will neither effectually answer its national object, nor prevent the local mischiefs which 
everywhere excite disgusts agst. the State Governments"); James Wilson, Debate in the 
Federal Convention (June 16, 1787), in 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS 252 (Madison's notes); 
id. at 277 (Yates Notes) (criticizing the New Jersey Plan as vesting Congress with addi-
tional powers in a "few inadequate instances" and praising Madison's Virginia Plan for 
allowing Congress to legislate "on all national concerns"). 
142 See generally CiiARLEs HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JAMES MADISON 
ANDTHERULEOFLAW209-ll (1996). 
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1. The Claimed Limits of Taxation to Enumeration 
Perhaps the most important constitutional battle of the 
early republic contested whether taxation for the general welfare 
would be allowed. Thomas Jefferson consistently maintained 
that the proper division between the national and state govern-
ments is that national government would have power over for-
eign concerns and the states would have power over domestic 
concerns. 
143 It was important to the Jeffersonian party that the 
first, or tax, clause of section 8 should be limited in scope to the 
purposes enumerated in clauses 2-17. 
The first clause of section 8 gives Congress the power to tax 
"to provide for the common Defence and the general Welfare." 
The language, the Jeffersonians argued, was a mere preface, 
given a more specific meaning by following clauses. It was as if 
the tax clause said that Congress could tax "for common defense 
and general welfare, specifically or namely for the powers of clauses 
2-17." In Federalist No. 41, Madison argued that "[n]othing is more 
natural or common than first to use a general phrase," namely, 
common defense and general welfare, "and then to explain and 
qualify it by a recital of particulars. "144 In the debate over the na-
tional bank in 1791, Madison argued that no additional federal 
power was given by the terms, "common defence, and general 
welfare" in clause 1, because those terms were themselves "lim-
ited and explained by the particular enumeration subjoined."145 
The subsequent enumerated powers, as Jefferson ~ut it, give an 
"exact definition" of the general welfare language. 6 
Madison cared considerably about limiting spending to the 
objects enumerated in clauses 2 through 17. As President in 
1817, Madison vetoed federal financing of canal construction on 
143. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 16, 1786), in 10 
JEFFERSON PAPERS 603; accord Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gideon Granger (Aug. 
13, 1800), in WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 1079 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1892-99) 
(saying that the true theory is that states are independent as to everything within them-
selves and general government is reduced to foreign concerns only). 
144. THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 277-78 (James Madison) (first published Jan. 19, 
1788). 
145. James Madison, Speech in the House of Representatives (Feb. 3, 1791), in 1 
ANNALS 1946, 1st Cong., 3d Sess.; see also Letter from James Madison to Andrew Ste-
venson (Nov. 17. 1830), in 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS 494 ("Common defence and general 
welfare [are used] as general terms, limited and explained by the particular clauses sub-
joined to the clause containing them."). 
146. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin (June 16, 1817), in 12 
JEFFERSON PAPERS 71-73 (referring to "the exact definition of powers immediately fol-
lowing" the general welfare clause). 
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d 147M d' the grounds that canals were not an enumerate power. a 1-
son had previously advocated and signed bills for spending on 
internal improvements.148 Even his veto message stated that the 
power to build roads and canals was "justly ranked among the 
greatest advantages ... of good Government."149 In preparation 
for the Constitutional Convention, Madison had listed canal-
building as a project of "general utility" that was defeated under 
the Articles of Confederation by "the perverseness of particular 
States whose concurrence is necessary."150 But as Jefferson's 
heir, President Madison found spending for canals justified only 
by the general welfare to be unconstitutional. 
Opposition to federal financing of internal improvements 
justified only by the "general welfare" became a keystone of Jef-
fersonian and Southern politics up through the Civil War.151 
Southerners denounced the claimed "general welfare" power as 
a Northern rationalization for su~Eorting development that 
served parochial Northern interests. 2 John C. Calhoun argued 
that only the sovereign states, and not the federal Congress, 
could ascertain the general welfare.153 After seccession in 1861, 
the Confederate States adopted a constitution that followed the 
United States Constitution, albeit with corrections that the 
South judged necessary. The Confederate Constitution, for in-
stance, protected the "right of property in any Negro slave."154 
One of the Southern "corrections" was to strip power to provide 
for the "general welfare" out of the section conferring powers to 
the Confederate Congess and out of the preamble to the Con-
federate constitution. 5 Just to make sure, the Confederate Con-
147. Veto Message (March 8, 1817, in 1 MESSAGFS AND PAPERS OF 1HE PREsiDENTS 
584--85 (James D. Richardson ed., 1908). 
148. See Stuart Leibiger, Cumberland Road, in JAMES MADISON AND 1HE AMERICAN 
NATION 105-{)6 (Robert A. Rutland ed., 1994). 
149. Veto Message (March 8,1817), in 1 MESSAGFS AND PAPERS OFlHE PREsiDENTS 
584-85 (James D. Richardson ed., 1908). 
150. James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States (Apr. 1787), in 
9 MADISON PAPERS 351. 
151. Cf Forrest McDonald, Tenth Amendment, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO 
1HE SUPREME COURT OF 1HE UNITED STATES 862 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992)("[F]rom 
the presidency of Jefferson to that of Abraham Lincoln, the consensus was that Jefferson 
had been right in calling the Tenth Amendment the foundation of the constitutional un-
ion.") 
152. MARSHALL DEROSA, THE CONFEDERATE CONSTITUTION OF 1861: AN 
INQUIRY INTO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 93-94 (1991). 
153. JOHN C. CALHOUN, A DISEASE INTO 1HE CONSTITUTION, in 1 WORKS OF 
JOHN C. CALHOUN 350--51 (Richard K. Cralle ed., 1851). 
154. Confederate Constitution art. 1, sec. 9, cl. 4, reprinted in DEROSA, supra note 
152, at 141. 
155. DEROSA, supra note 152, at 139; see also CHARLFS ROBERT LEE, JR., THE 
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stitution also prohibited any subsidy or tariff to promote or fos-
ter any branch of industry and prohibited appropriation for any 
internal improvements.156 
2. Justification of Tax for the "General Welfare" 
a. The textual arguments. Madison's textual arguments for 
limiting the tax power to the enumerated purposes in clauses 2-
17 are not persuasive. Madison argued, first, that under the Arti-
cles of Confederation, from which the standard was taken, 
"common defense and general welfare" was never understood as 
a general grant of power, but only as a power to tax for things 
specifically enumerated in the Articles. 157 What would have been 
thought, Madison asked rhetorically, if the Continental Congress 
had disregarded "the specifications which ascertain and limit 
their import [and] exercised an unlimited power of providing for 
the common defense and general welfare?" He thought the ar-
gument contained "its own condemnation."158 
The Articles, however, seem more to rebut than to support 
Madison's claim. Congress under the Articles, for instance, had 
undertaken projects of the sort that the Jeffersonians con-
demned, including chartering a national bank. Congress had paid 
for maps and surveys, which was at least the precursor to public 
works projects. The old confederation had been destitute, and 
destitution does impose its limitations. Interpreting the scope of 
the Congress' power under the Articles does require answering a 
counterfactual question: What would Congress have done if it 
had money? At least on paper, though, the Articles did give 
Congress the power to charge expenses for the common defense 
and general welfare to the general treasury. Madison wrote that 
the Convention failed to include an explicit reference to the sub-
joined powers within the general welfare clause because of "an 
inattention to the phraseology, occasioned doubtless by its iden-
tity with the harmless character attached to it in the instrument 
from which it was borrowed."159 The primary purpose of the 
CoNFEDERATE CoNSTITUTION 45 (1963) (reporting that the "general welfare" power 
was excluded in deference to states rights). 
156. Confederate Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8, in DEROSA, supra note 152, at 140. 
157. James Madison, Repon of 1800 on the Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 7, 1800), in 17 
MADISON PAPERS 303, 313-14 (saying that "general welfare" was never understood in 
the Articles as a general power to authorize money for the general welfare, except in the 
cases afterward enumerated, and that the enumerated powers "explained and limited" 
general welfare). 
158. THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 278 (Madison) (Jan. 19, 1788). 
159. Letter from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson (Nov. 27, 1830), in 3 
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Constitution as a whole was to end exactly that kind of "harm-
lessness" caused by the destitution of the Congress under the 
Articles.160 
In Federalist No. 41, Madison argued that the fact that the 
phrase, "common Defence and general Welfare," in Article I, 
section 8, clause 1 was not "separated by a longer pause than a 
semicolon" from the enumerated powers of clauses 2-17 was 
evidence that the enumerated powers specified what was within 
the general welfare.161 In the Articles of Confederation, how-
ever, the general welfare and enumerated powers paragraphs did 
not abut each other. Old Article VIII allowed Congress to 
charge expenses for the common defense and general welfare to 
the common treasury. The first three long paragraphs of Article 
IX were devoted to state-border disputes and other unrelated 
matters. Article IX then listed the enumerated powers that were 
brought into the Constitution. The Articles' enumerated powers 
were not plausibly linked with the more general "common de-
fense and general welfare." They were not "subjoined" or "sepa-
rated by a semicolon" or connected in any other way. Indeed, in 
the text of the Articles of Confederation, Article VIII, on charg-
ing expenses for the general welfare to the common treasury, 
and Article IX, the enumerated powers, seem to hold equal 
weight. 
In trying to argue that "general welfare" had no independ-
ent meaning, Madison also asserted that the general standard 
came first and that the Convention assumed that the language 
would be reduced "later in the session" by "proper limitations 
FARRAND'S RECORDS 483, 486 and 9 MADISON WRITINGS 411, 418; see also 3 
FARRAND'S RECORDS 487, 9 MADISON WRITINGS 411, 418-19 ("these terms copied 
from the Articles of Confederation, were regarded in the new as in the old Instrument 
merely as general terms, explained & limited by the subjoined specifications; and there-
fore requiring no critical attention or studied precaution"); James Madison, Repon of 
1800 on the Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 7, 1800), in 17 MADISON PAPERS 303,313--14 (say-
ing that under the Articles, the phrase "common defense and general welfare" was un-
derstood as covering only "the cases afterwards enumerated which explained and limited 
their meaning"). 
160. See, e.g., Letter from Phineas Bond to Lord Carmarthen (July 2, 1787), in 3 
FARRAND'S RECORDS 52 (describing the Constitution as giving the federal government 
"energy and consequence"). 
161. THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 277 (Madison) (Jan. 19, 1788); Letter from James 
Madison to Andrew Stevenson (Nov. 27, 1830), in 4 MADISON PAPERS 120. See also 2 
THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 453, 456 ("Memorandum not used in letter to Mr. Ste-
venson"). Madison also spent a great deal of time worrying about whether "common de-
fense and general welfare" might have been separated by commas or colons, rather than 
semicolons, from the enumeration. The resolution of the issue in the text treats all that 
punctuation as beside the point. 
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and specifications."162 But the language "to provide for the 
common defense and general welfare" was inserted into clause 1 
by a Brearly Committee of Eleven report on September 4, 
1787.163 Most of the enumerated powers were already in place, 
since the Committee of Detail report on August 6. Madison's in-
terpretation that "general welfare" had no independent meaning 
makes no sense for a later-added clause. If the "common defense 
and general welfare" power was intended to be nugatory lan-
guage for a section that already expressed the Convention's en-
tire intent, why would a committee and full convention go out of 
their way to add it? 
In his Commentaries on the Constitution, Joseph Story con-
cluded that Madison's argument needed a better textual basis. 
According to Story, the clause does not say, "to 'provide for the 
common defence, and general welfare, in manner following, 
viz.,' which would be the natural expression, to indicate such an 
intention."164 lf the enumeration were to be considered an "exact 
definition" of the general welfare, the power to provide for the 
general welfare in clause 1 would need a word such as "namely" 
or "specifically" after it to tie it to the listed powers that fol-
lowed. 
b. The Federalists' broad descriptions. During the ratifica-
tion debate, proponents of the Constitution also defended a very 
broad federal power to tax for the common defense and general 
welfare. "That their powers are thus extensive is admitted," 
James Wilson told the Pennsylvania ratification convention, 
162. Madison claimed that the "general terms or phrases used in the introductory 
proposition ... were never meant to be inserted in their loose form in the text of the 
Constitution .... It was understood by all that they were to be reduced by proper limita-
tions and specification into a form in which they were to be final and operative, as was 
actually done in the progress of the session." Letter from James Madison to Robert S. 
Garnett (Feb. 11, 1824), reprinted in SUPPLEMENT TO MAX FARRAND'S THE RECORDS 
OF THE FEDERAL CoNVENTION OF 1787, at 313 (James H. Hutson ed., 1987); cf Unde-
livered Letter from James Madison to John Tyler, in 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS 524, 526-
27 (arguing that the Virginia Plan's language for federal jurisdiction where states were 
incompetent or harmony of the states required it was understood not as final language 
but as phrases which, if adopted, would "be reduced to their proper shape & specifica-
tion"); JOSEPH LYNCH, NEGOTIATING THE CoNSTITUTION 236 n.21 (1999) (arguing that 
the letters represent a practicing politician trying to get himself off the hook). LANCE 
BANNING, SACRED FIRE OF LmERTY 157-M (1995) takes Madison seriously on the 1833 
claim. But see RALPH KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON (1990); CLINTON ROSSITOR, THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CoNVENTION (1956). 
163. Report of the Brearly Committee of Eleven (Sept. 4, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S 
RECORDS 497 (Madison notes). 
164. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES §§ 908, 910, 911 (1833). 
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"and would any thing short of this have been sufficient?"165 "I 
may venture to predict," he said, "that the taxes of the general 
government ... will be more equitable, and much less expensive, 
than those imposed by state governments."166 
The Federalists especially defended a broad power of fed-
eral taxation to provide for the common defense. "Wars have 
now become rather wars of the purse than of the sword," Ells-
worth told Connecticut. "A government which can command but 
half its resources is like a man with but one arm to defend him-
self."167 "The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations 
are infinite," Hamilton said similarly, "and for this reason no 
constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to 
which the care of it is committed. "168 The power to provide for 
the common defense and general welfare, one J. Choate told 
Massachusetts, "can be no other than an unlimited power of 
taxation, if that defence requires it."169 "The idea of restraining 
the Legislative authority, in the means of providing for the na-
tional defence," Hamilton said, "is one of those refinements, 
which owe their origin to a zeal for liberty more ardent than 
enlightened. "170 Even the most ardent advocates of state power 
believed that Congress should have enough power to "call out 
the common strengths for the common defense." 171 
The full phrase, "to provide for the common defence and 
general welfare," also links a broad interpretation of the com-
mon defense with a broad interpretation of the general welfare. 
165. James Wilson, Speech Before the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (Dec. 
4, 17F:7), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 466; see also James Wilson {Dec. 1, 17F:7), in 2 ELLIOT'S 
DEBATES 444 (arguing that the Constitution drew its power from the people because that 
was the only safe system of power "sufficient to manage the general interest of the 
United States"). 
166. James Wilson, Speech before the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (Dec. 4, 
17F:7), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 467-68. 
167. Oliver Ellsworth, Connecticut Ratifying Convention (Jan. 7, 1788), in 2 
ELLIOT'S DEBATES 191. 
168. THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 147 {Hamilton) {Dec.18, 1787). 
169. J. Choate, Speech to the Massachusetts Ratification Convention, Jan. 23, 1788, 
in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 79. 
170. THE FEDERALIST No. 26, at 164 (Hamilton) {Dec. 22, 1787); see also THE 
FEDERALIST No. 31, at 196 {Hamilton) (Jan. 1, 1788) (saying that the duties of national 
defense and of securing the public peace against foreign or domestic violence have "no 
other bounds than the exigencies of the nation and the resources of the community"); 
Edmund Randolph, Debate in Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 6, 1788), in 3 
ELLIOT'S DEBATES 115 ("Wars cannot be carried on without a full and uncontrolled dis-
cretionary power to raise money in an eligible manner."). 
171. Letter from Thomas Burke to Governor Thomas Caswell, (Apr. 29, 1777), in 6 
LETTERS OF DELEGATES 672. 
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Hamilton explicitly argued that taxation should have a broad 
range of goals: 
Money is with propriety considered as the vital principle of 
the body politic; as that which sustains its life and motion, and 
enables it to perform its most essential functions. A complete 
power therefore to procure a regular and adequate supply of 
it, as far as the resources of the community will permit, may 
be re~arded as an indispensable ingredient in every constitu-
tion.' 
Why in any event, the Federalists asked, would any man "choose 
a lame horse, lest a sound one run away with him?"173 In defend-
ing his plan to subsidize American manufacturing, Hamilton ar-
gued in 1791 that "[t]he phrase [common defense and general 
welfare] is as comprehensive as any that could be used." The 
constitutional authority of the Union to tax, he said, should not 
have been restricted within limits any narrower than the 'Gen-
eral Welfare."' 174 
Thus, both the text of the Constitution and the arguments of 
the proponents support a general power to tax for the common 
defense and general welfare, even beyond the enumeration. 
McCulloch settled that there was an enumerated power doctrine 
outside of tax, but within tax the settlement went the other way. 
It is also now settled legal doctrine that Congress can tax and 
spend for the common defense and general welfare beyond the 
range of the specifically enumerated clauses that follow clause 
1.175 
172. THE FEDERALIST No. 30, at 188 (Hamilton) (Dec. 28, 1787); see also id. at 191 
(arguing that a government always half supplied can provide for security or advance 
prosperity). 
173. A Citizen of Philadelphia, Remarks on the Address of Sixteen Members (Oct. 18, 
1787), reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTORY HISTORY 297, 301; see also James Wilson, Summa-
tion and Final Rebuttal in the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (Dec. 11, 1787), in 1 
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 839 (arguing that it would be very unwise for the con-
vention to refuse to adopt the Constitution, because it granted Congress power to lay and 
collect taxes for the purpose of providing for the common defense and general welfare); 
Edmund Randolph, Speech Before the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 7, 1788), in 3 
ELLIOT'S DEBATES 122 (arguing that the power of imposing taxes "has been proved to 
be essential to the very existence of the Union"). 
174. Alexander Hamilton, Report on the Subject of Manufacturers (Dec. 5, 1791), in 
10 HAMILTON PAPERS 230, 303; see also 1 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS 
AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 402 (1953) (arguing 
that Hamilton did not concede that the common defense and general welfare standard is 
restricted to tax). 
175. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 6~ (1936) (holding, in a case of first 
impression, that clause 1 gives Congress the power to tax and appropriate for the general 
welfare and not just for the enumerated powers in the following clauses); Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90-91 (1976) (observing that the power of Congress to authorize the 
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3. General Welfare Beyond Tax 
In clause 1 of the Constitution's recitation of the powers of 
Congress, the phrase "to provide for the common Defence and 
general Welfare" modifies the power to tax. Clause 1 provides 
that Congress shall have the power to collect taxes in order to 
pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general 
welfare of the United States. In the Articles of Confederation, 
from which the phrase was copied, the phrase described Con-
gress's power to charge expenses to the common treasury. 176 
Nevertheless, in the text of the Constitution, the necessary 
and proper clause appears to convert a tax power into a power to 
provide for the common defense and general welfare by any 
means. Clause 18 of article I, section 8 authorizes Congress to 
"make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying 
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers 
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United 
States." As Chief Justice Marshall said in McCulloch v. Mary-
land,177 "[l]et the end be ... within the scope of the constitution, 
and all means which are appropriate, ... which are not prohib-
ited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution, 
are constitutional."178 The object of clause 1 is the common de-
fense and general welfare, and taxation is just an instrument for 
achieving that goal. Clause 18 allows other nontax instruments. 
Madison thought that the necessary and proper clause extended 
clause 1 beyond taxation. Although Madison disliked that con-
clusion in 1830 and used it to show that even the tax power 
needed to be confined to the enumerated powers and could not 
extend to general welfare, 179 the argument that Madison feared 
is plausible. The necessary and proper clause allows the federal 
government to operate within the appropriately national or 
common sphere by any means. 
expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited to enumerated grants). 
176. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. VIII ("All charges of war, and all other 
expenses that shall be incurred for the common defense or general welfare, and allowed 
by the ~nited States in Congress assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common treas-
ury .... ) 
177. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.). 
178. /d. at 421. 
179. James Madison, Supplement to the letter of November 27, 1830 to Andrew Ste-
venson, On the Phrase "Common Defence and General Welfare," in 2 THE FOUNDERS 
CONSTITUTION 453, 458 and 9 MADISON WRITINGS 411, 427; see also AN OLD WHIG II, 
PHILADELPHIA GAZEITEER (Oct. 17, 1787) (arguing that Congress may judge what is 
necessary and proper in any cases whatsoever and so avoid an enumeration limitation), 
reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 399, 402. 
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Clauses 1 and 18 can be read together to convert a tax 
power into a general power partly because the Founders would 
not have drawn an important distinction between tax and other 
instruments. Once federal taxation was allowed, all other powers 
would follow as a matter of course. If the people will trust the 
Congress on matters of money and revenue, Roger Sherman told 
the Convention, "they will trust them with any other necessary 
powers. "180 Tax was the most feared instrument of government. 
"Regulation" would be swept into the federal power if taxation 
were allowed. For example, James Monroe, an Anti-Federalist 
in the debates, thought that the federal government should have 
the power to regulate commerce, but ~so thought that the fed-
eral government should not get the revenue from the taxes on 
commerce unless the states specifically ceded that revenue.181 
The "celebrated Montesquieu establishes it as a maxim," Centi-
nel said, "that legislation necessarily follows the power of taxa-
tion."182 Other opponents of the Constitution also said that the 
"common Defence and general Welfare" language allowed the 
federal legislature to "pass any law which they may think 
proper"183 and to have power "co-extensive with every possible 
residuum of human legislation."184 
Taxation was commonly treated as the whole issue. Even if 
its "common Defence and general Welfare" power were limited 
to tax, Congress could use taxation to turn a federation into a 
consolidated government: "The assumption of this power of lay-
ing direct taxes does, of itself," Mason told Virginia, "entirely 
change the confederation of the states into one consolidated 
government. This power, being at discretion, unconfined, and 
without any kind of control, must carry every thing before it."185 
180. Roger Sherman, Speech to the Federal Convention (June 20, 1787), in 1 
FARRAND'S RECORDS 342. 
181. Letter of James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 14, 1784), 22 LETfERS OF 
TI:IE DELEGATES 72 (saying that Congress will distinguish between taxation and regula-
tion of commerce, "the former unless ceded by the State to go to the State"); see also 
Letter of Charles Thomson (Pennsylvania) to John Dickinson (Dec. 25, 1780), 16 
LE'ITERS OF TI:IE DELEGATES 492 (disapproving of taxes for revenue, but approving of 
taxes "on foreign articles of luxury which we can well do without" as a "regulation of 
trade"). 
182. CENTINEL (SAMUEL BRYAN) I, PHILADELPIDA INDEPENDENT GAZETfEER 
(Oct. 5, 1787), reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CoNSTITUTION 53, 57. 
183. John Williams, Debate in the New York Ratification Convention (June 26, 
1787), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 330; see also id. at 338. 
184. LETTER FROM RICHARD HENRY LEE TO Gov. EDMUND RANDOLPH, 
PETERSBURG VIRGINIA GAZETfE (Dec. 6, 1787), reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 364, 368. 
185. George Mason, Debate in the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 4, 1788), 
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If Congress were granted the paramount power to tax6 Brutus 
wrote, Congress would draw all other powers after it. 18 Patrick 
Henry looked with horror upon the power to provide for the 
common defense and general welfare as yet another chance to 
free the slaves: 
Have they not power to provide for the general defence and 
welfare? May they not think that these call for the abolition 
of slavery? May they not pronounce all slaves free, and will 
they not be warranted by that power? This is no ambiguous 
implication or logical deduction. The paper speaks to the 
point: they have the power in clear8 unequivocal terms, and will clearly and certainly exercise it. 1 7 
The proponents of the Constitution would not have drawn a 
meaningful line between tax and regulation. In his initial expla-
nation of the Constitution to Jefferson, Madison said that the 
"line between the power of regulating trade and that of drawing 
revenue from it, which was once considered as the barrier to our 
liberties was found on fair discussion, to be absolutely undefin-
able."188 
The debaters, on both sides, often switched words as if 
"regulation" and "taxation" were near synonyms. For example, 
Nathaniel Gorham called New York state's tax on imports 
through New York harbor a "regulation of trade."189 Federalist 
No. 7 called all state taxes on imports "opportunities, which 
some States would have of rendering others tributary to them, 
by commercial regulations. "19° Federalist No. 12 espoused a fed-
eral tax on "ardent spirits," which it called a "federal regula-
tion."191 Anti-Federalist Rawlins Lowndes labeled a 1783 pro-
posal to give Congress the power to tax imports a power "to 
regulate commerce."192 In October 1787, before the Constitution 
was ratified, John Jay gave his legal opinion as Secretary of For-
eign Affairs that Congress had no power to establish a "regula-
in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 29. 
186. Brutus I, NEW YORK J. (Oct. 18, 1787), reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 411, 415. 
187. Patrick Henry, Debate in the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 24, 1787), 
in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 590. 
188. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 10 
MADISON PAPERS 205,211. 
189. Nathaniel Gorham, Speech before the Federal Convention (July 23, 1787), in 2 
FARRAND'S RECORDS 90, 
190. THE FEDERALIST NO.7, at 40 (Hamilton) (Nov. 17, 1787) (emphasis added) .. 
191. THEFEDERALISTN0.12, at 78 (Hamilton) (Nov. 27, 1787). 
192. Rawlins Lowndes, Debate in the South Carolina Legislature (Jan. 16, 1788), in 2 
DEBATE ON TiiE CONSTITUTION 22. 
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tion," such as a proposed impost on seamen's wages to raise 
~onex3 for ransoming American seamen. held captive in Al-giers. The proposal Jay called a "regulation" was in fact a tax 
to raise revenue. Taxation was sometimes a power within the 
power to regulate commerce194 and regulation was sometimes a 
subset of the power to tax. 195 The easy switches between tax and 
regulation may seem strange to modem ears, but they indicate 
that the Founders would not have drawn a legally significant line 
preventing federal regulation once federal tax for the same end 
was allowed. 
In the Virginia ratification convention, Edmund Randolph 
denied that the power to provide for the common defense and 
general welfare could extend beyond taxation. Patrick Henry 
had just argued that the power to provide for the common de-
fense and general welfare was yet another opportunity for Con-
gress to free the slaves.196 Randolph replied that the power could 
not be used to free the slaves: 
They can only raise money .... No man who reads it can say it 
is general, as [Patrick Henry] represents it. You must violate 
every rule of construction and common sense, if you sever it 
from the power of raising money, and annex it to any thing 
else, in order to make it that formidable power which it is rep-
resented to be. 197 
193. Letter of John Jay, Secretary of Foreign Affairs to John Paul Jones (Oct. 6, 
1787) in 33 JCC636. 
194. Letter of Samuel Johnson to Stephen Mix Mitchell (Aug. 25, 1786) ("The Regu-
lation of Trade is as essential a point to be obtain'd as the Impost, the former will even-
tually include the Latter and ought to be urged with as much pathos."), reprinted in 23 
LETfER OF DELEGATES 525; HUGH WILLIAMSON, SPEECH AT EDENTON, NORTH 
CAROLINA (NOV. 8, 1787),printed in THE DAILY ADVERTISER (NEW YORK) (Feb. 25-
27, 1788) (saying that sundry regulations of commerce will give the government power 
not only to collect vast revenue, but also to secure the carrying trade in the hands of citi-
zens in preference to strangers), reprinted in 2 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 231; 1HE 
FEDERALIST No. 22, at I37 (Hamilton) (Nov. 27, 1787) (arguing that if the Constitution 
is not ratified, the states might increase their "interfering and unneighborly" regulations 
and pointing to the German taxes on river commerce to illustrate the danger); 1HE 
FEDERALIST No. 84 (Hamilton) (May 28, 1788) (arguing that national legislature will be 
able to acquire enough information to regulate commerce, even for internal collections 
of tax); Letter from James Madison to Joseph C. cabell (Sept. 18, 1828), in 9 MADISON 
WRITINGS 316, 334 (arguing that Congress may "regulate Commerce, not just to raise 
revenue, but also to encourage domestic manufacture"). 
195. Edmund Randolph, Draft of the Constitution, Committee of Detail, in 2 
FARRAND'S RECORDS 142-43 (outlining congressional "regulation of commerce" as a 
subdivision of the power to raise money by taxation). 
196. Patrick Henry, Debate in the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 24, 1787), 
in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 590, quoted in text accompanying note 187 supra. 
197. Edmund Randolph, Debate in the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 24, 
1787), in 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS 599-600. 
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Under the pressure of the context, Randolph was proposing a 
distinction that no one else would have taken seriously at the 
time. The Virginia Anti-Federalists sought to defeat ratification 
of the Constitution foremost with the argument that ratification 
would allow the nonslave states in the majority to would abolish 
slavery. The Virginia ratification convention debated the Consti-
tution clause by clause, and Patrick Henry found proof clause by 
clause that the Congress would end slavery upon ratification. 
Congress would use its power over commerce, according to 
Henry, to end the slave trade after 1808.198 Congress would use 
its power over war to say that every black man must fight and 
then free him.199 Congress would use its power to provide for the 
general defense and welfare to emancipate all slaves/00 and 
Confoess could use its tax power to tax the slaves to manumis-
sion. 01 "We ought to possess [slaves] in the manner we have in-
herited them from our ancestors," Patrick Henry told Virginia, 
"as their manumission is incompatible with the felicity of the 
country."202 
The Virginia Federalists denied that Congress could end 
slavery, even when Patrick Henry correctly described Congress's 
power. Madison argued that if Congress attempted to free the 
slaves, it would be a usurpation of power: "There is no power to 
warrant it, in that paper."203 Some of his arguments are unsup-
portable. Madison, for example, argued that the Congress could 
not tax slaves to manumission because direct taxes had to be ap-
portioned. The Constitution requires that "direct taxes" -that 
is, internal taxes in the nature of requisitions upon the states-
must be collected from the states in proportion to population, 
198. U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 9, cl. 1. Patrick Henry thought the power to end the slave 
trade rebutted the doctrine of enumerated powers. See Speech Before The Virginia Con-
vention (June 17, 1788), in 3 ELUOT'S DEBATES 455 ("Where then was their doctrine of 
reserved rights?"). Deep water shipping is at the center of the power to regulate com-
merce, so it is difficult to see why the prohibition of the slave trade would not be within 
the enumerated commerce power. 
199. Patrick Henry, Speech Before the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 24, 
1788), in 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1476. 
200. Id. 
201. Patrick Henry, Debate in the Virginia Convention (June 17, 1788), in 10 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1341-42 (arguing that Congress might lay such heavy taxes on 
slaves, amounting to emancipation, such "that this property would be lost to this coun-
try"). 
202. Patrick Henry, Debate in the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 24 1788) 
in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 591. ' ' 
203. James Madison, Speech to the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 24 1788) 
in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 621-22. ' 
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counting slaves at three-fifths.204 Both representation in the 
House and direct tax must be apportioned according to the same 
formula. The formula was extended from representation in the 
House to direct taxes because the North feared that allowing 
votes, and only votes, in the House to depend on slaves could 
cause the South to enslave more Africans. Taxes on slaves mod-
erated the South's incentives to add more slaves.205 But Madison 
flipped the intent and found protection for slavery. Congress 
could not annihilate slavery by taxation, Madison claimed, be-
cause the "taxation of the State [is to be] equal only to its repre-
sentation. "206 Other Virginia Federalists adopted the argument 
that Congress could not tax slaves at so high a rate as to amount 
to emancipation because "taxation and representation were 
fixed by the Constitution according to the census," so that Con-
gress could not tax the slaves out of existence "without ruining 
free people in other states."207 
Anti-Federalists Patrick Henry and George Mason replied, 
quite correctly, that they could see how apportionment pro-
tected slavery. Each state's quota of an apportioned or direct tax 
was to be determined in proportion to population, they argued, 
but Congress alone determined the objects to be taxed. Once a 
state's quantum was fixed, Congress could require the full 
amount to be laid upon slavery alone. 208 Mason and Henry cor-
204. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9, cl. 4; § 2, cl. 3. 
205. See, e.g., Govemeur Morris, Aug. 8, 1787, 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS 222 ("The 
admission of slaves into the Representation comes to this: that the inhabitant of Georgia 
and S. C. who goes to the Coast of Africa, and in defiance of the most sacred laws of hu-
manity tears away his fellow creatures from their dearest connections & dam<n>s them 
to the most cruel bandages, shall [thereby] have more votes in a Govt. instituted for pro-
tection of the rights of mankind."); see also Rufus King, Aug. 8, 1787, 2 FARRAND'S 
RECORDS 220 (objecting strenuously to counting slaves in representation if importation 
of slaves were not limited). See generally Calvin Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes: 
The Foul-up in the Core of the Constitution, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 99-101 
(1998). 
206. James Madison, Debate in the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 17, 
1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 453 (arguing that apportionment would prevent Congress 
from imposing oppressive taxes on tobacco or slaves that Northern states would escape); 
see also James Madison, Debate in the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 12, 1788), 
in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1204 (arguing that Virginia was protected because its 
proportion of direct tax would be commensurate to its population); James Madison, De-
bate in the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 17,1788), in 3 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 1342-43 (arguing that the census was intended to introduce equality into the 
burdens to be laid on the community). 
207. George Nicolas, Speech to the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 17, 
1788), in 3 Elliot's Debates 457 (arguing that two-fifths of all slaves are exempted from 
tax under the Constitution); The State Soldier IV, VIR. INDEP. CHRoN. (Mar. 19, 1788), 
in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 509, 511. 
208. Patrick Henry, Debates in the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 17, 1787) 
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reedy read the text; Madison was wrong. The apportionment 
formula affects only the allocation of taxes among states and it 
has no effect on rates or objects of taxes within a state. Congress 
could have required that Virginia pay its entire quota from a tax 
on slaves. Madison erred in arguing that the apportionment of 
tax was intended to favor slavery; the point was to tax the South 
more if it had more slaves so as to offset the incentive that the 
inclusion of slaves in representation gave to the South to in-
crease its slaves. Congress did not in fact free the slaves before 
the Civil War, but the Constitution does seem to have allowed 
the federal government to free the slaves by heavy taxes, by set-
ting free slaves drafted as soldiers, and by other tools. 
Randolph's statement that "common defense and general wel-
fare" could not be extended beyond tax should be counted 
among other soothing things the Virginia Federalists said to ap-
pease the slaveholders so they would not vote against ratifica-
tion. They were arguments in the heat of the moment made 
without justification from the text and they probably should not 
be taken seriously. 
It is now settled doctrine, however, that the federal gov-
ernment may tax for the general welfare, but that general wel-
fare does not justify government instruments beyond tax. Allow-
ing federal legislation for the general welfare beyond tax is said 
to transform the federal government into one of unlimited 
range.209 "Common Defence and general Welfare," however, is a 
synonym for "exigencies," "necessities" or "general interests" of 
the Union. If that standard applied beyond tax, it would not al-
low activity outside of a sphere considered appropriately "com-
mon," "general" or national. Still, the settled law holds that the 
common defense and general welfare standard does not apply 
beyond taxation. 
III. IMPLIED AND EXPLODING POWERS 
The doctrine of enumerated powers would strictly prohibit 
federal activities not included within the Constitution's list of 
powers. Nonetheless, the doctrine has been interpreted to allow 
the federal government powers over foreign affairs that are not 
on the list. The doctrine, moreover, accommodates to the exi-
in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 457; George Mason, Debates in the Virginia Ratification Conven-
tion (June 17, 17ff7) in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES at 458. 
209. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 64 (1936). 
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gencies of the union by allowing an explosively broad interpreta-
tion of the power to regulate commerce. 
A. IMPLIED POWERS: THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY 
Jefferson argued that the enumerated powers were exhaus-
tive and not enhanced by either the tax clause or the necessary 
and proper clause, but he also took the position that the federal 
government had implied powers, without a textual basis, when 
enumerated powers did not support activities he wanted to un-
dertake. As President, Jefferson wanted to acquire new land and 
peoples for the United States by purchasing Louisiana and Flor-
ida. He was embarrassed in both cases, however, in that he had 
argued that Congress had no powers that were not enumerated 
and that the power to acquire added territo~ was not within a 
strict construction of the enumerated powers. 10 To allow the ac-
quisitions of new territory, Jefferson used two extraordinary 
doctrines: first, the "laws of necessity" and, second, that acquisi-
tion was inherent in the nature of federal sovereignty. Both ne-
cessity and inherent sovereignty purport to arise from authority 
beyond strict adherence to constitutional text. The internal logic 
of both "necessity" and "sovereignty" could compass everything. 
In the fall of 1805, while Congress was not in session and 
had appropriated no money, President Jefferson agreed to pur-
chase Florida from Spain for $2 million.211 After his retirement 
from the Presidency, Jefferson wrote that the purchase of Flor-
ida had been justified by the "law of necessity" and "self preser-
vation," which was paramount to the "obligation to give strict 
observance of written law." 212 Jefferson likened the purchase of 
Florida to Washington's firing cannons at a private house in the 
battle of Germantown after having receiving fire from the 
house.213 
Jefferson passed over some alternative rationales for the 
constitutionality of the purchase. The purchase of Florida raised 
the same issue as the Louisiana Purchase: how the federal gov-
210. See Letter from President Thomas Jefferson to Kentucky Senator John Breck-
inridge (Aug. 12, 1803), in 10 WORKS OF JEFFERSON 7 ("The Constitution has made no 
provision for our holding foreign territory, still less for incorporating foreign nations into 
our Union"). 
211. See DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL 1iiOUGHT OF 1iiOMAS 
JEFFERSON 236 (1994). 
212. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin, September 20, 1810, BASIC 
JEFFERSON 683. 
213. See id. 
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ernment had the power to acquire new territory and people in 
the absence of an express grant. Jefferson's Secretary of the 
Treasury, Albert Gallatin, had given Jefferson a legal opinion 
that the Louisiana Purchase was justified by a combination of 
the President's power to make treaties with approval of two-
thirds of the Senate214 and the power to administer and dispose 
of territories and property owned by the United States.215 Jeffer-
son rejected both arguments, saying that "[t]he Constitution has 
made no provision for our holding foreign territory, still less for 
incorporating foreign nations into our Union."216 Jefferson had 
worried that Gallatin's "broad" interpretation would make the 
Constitution "a blank paper by construction."217 In 1810, he re-
lied on the law of necessity rather than a reading of the treaty 
and territorial powers that was too broad for his taste. 
If anything, the "law of necessity" rationale Jefferson ulti-
mately used seems even more problematic than Gallatin's solu-
tion, especially if his fundamental objection was that the federal 
government should not be given a blank piece of paper.218 In-
deed, Jefferson's "necessity" does not seem all that compelling. 
"Suppose," he said in 1810, 
it had been made known to the Executive of the Union in the 
autumn of 1805, that we might have the Floridas for a reason-
able sum, that that sum had not indeed been so appropriated 
by law, but that Congress were to meet within three weeks, 
and might appropriate it on the first or second day of their 
session. Ought he, for so great an advantage to his country, to 
have risked himself by transcending the law and making the 
purchase? The public advantage offered, in this supposed 
214. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators 
present concur."). 
215. U.S. CONST. art. IV,§ 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and 
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property be-
longing to the United States."). 
216. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Breckinridge (Senator from Kentucky 
(Aug.12, 1803), in 10 WORKS OF JEFFERSON 7. 
217. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Gary Nichols, Sept. 7, 1808, 8 
WRITINGS OF JEFFERSON 247-48; see MA. YER, supra note 211, at 244-51. 
218. David Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Jefferson and the West, 1801-1809, 
39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1441 (1998) concludes that Jefferson had the express power to 
acquire Louisiana and Florida: "It is very hard today, even for one who shares their gen-
eral appr~ach.to federal authority, to find merit in the remarkably cramped reading that 
Jefferson m his most self- effacing moment offered of the explicit authorization to make 
treaties." 1d. at 1474. Indeed, finding a slightly looser construction of the enumerated 
powers would been far less threatening to Jefferson's general claim that the enumerated 
powers were exhaustive than an unstated power from necessity that Jefferson ultimately 
adopted. The choice was Jefferson's, however. 
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case, was indeed immense; but a reverence for law, and the 
probability that the advantage might still be legally accom-
plished by a delay of only three weeks, were powerful reasons 
against hazarding the act. But suppose it foreseen that a John 
Randolph would find means to protract the proceeding on it 
by Congress, until the ensuing spring, by which time new cir-
cumstances would change the mind of the other party. Ought 
the Executive, in that case, and with that foreknowledge, to 
have secured the good to his country, and to have trusted to 
their justice for the transgression of the law?219 
With all due respect, Jefferson did not make a very good case 
that the purchase of Florida was a necessity that required him to 
go above the law. The administration might well have told Spain 
that the United States would accept the offer, subject to congres-
sional approval.220 If Spain had offered the Floridas for $2 mil-
lion, it was likely to have continued the offer for roughly the 
same price for a few weeks. Jefferson cited the trouble that his 
political antagonist, John Randolph, might have made, but in a 
democracy, opposition is part of the process and not a justifica-
tion for going above the law. This seemed to be a matter of ex-
ecutive convenience, and not necessity, especially for the Jeffer-
son who had previously argued that a national bank was not a 
necessary federal instrument, but only a convenience.221 Jeffer-
son's rationale amounts to a claim superior to the Constitution, 
and if "necessity" extends to such conveniences as this one, it 
difficult to see how anything else could stop it. 
Another extraordinay rationale, offered with respect to the 
Louisiana Purchase, was that the power to make federal acquisi-
tions arose from the nature of federal sovereignty. In 1803, Na-
poleon offered all the French-controlled territory west of the 
Mississippi to surprised American representatives, who had 
come to Paris looking only to purchase access to the sea through 
New Orleans for American commodities grown in the Missis-
sippi River watershed east of the river.222 There was a long de-
219. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810) in BASIC 
JEFFERSON 682, 683. 
220. U.S. CoNST., Art. II, §2, cl. 2 (requiring approval of a treaty by two-third vote of 
the Senate). 
221. Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of a Bill for Establishing a 
National Bank (Feb. 15, 1791), 19 JEFFERSON PAPERS 275, 278; accord James Madison, 
The Bank Bil~ Speech to the House of Representatives (Feb. 2, 1791) (saying that "condu-
cive" and "give facility to" are not synonymous with "necessary and proper"), reprinted 
in 13 MADISON PAPERS 372, 376-TI. 
222 See generally MARSHALL SMELSER, THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, 1801-1815, 
at 83-103 (1968); EVERETI S. BROWN, THE CoNSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF Tiffi 
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bate in Congress on the constitutionality of the Louisiana Pur-
chase,223 and the predominant justification was that the acquisi-
tion of territory was a power inherent in government without 
any need for enumeration. Senator Samuel Mitchill, a Jefferson-
ian from New York, argued that the power to acquire territory 
was "inherent in independent nations." The United States had 
acquired property through a number of treaties with the Indians, 
he argued, and if the Louisiana Purchase was invalid, so were all 
the Indian treaties.224 John Smilie, a Jeffersonian from Pennsyl-
vania, argued that the acquisition was constitutional because the 
right to annex territory belonged to all governments.225 Across 
party lines, James Elliot, a Federalist from Vermont, argued that 
the ability to acquire territory was based on the law of nations.226 
The best justification was, of course, the argument by Sena-
tor Caesar A. Rodney, a Jeffersonian from Delaware, who ar-
gued that the Louisiana Purchase fell within the power of Con-
gress "to provide for common Defence and general Welfare." 
"To provide for the general welfare!" he said, "The import of 
these terms is very comprehensive indeed. "227 Acquisition of the 
Floridas and the Louisiana Territory seems fully justified as one 
of those activities a national government may properly under-
take "to provide for the common Defense and general Welfare." 
The power to acquire territory, moreover, could be said to be 
one of those powers carried over from the Confederation. Con-
gress, under the Articles of Confederation, had taken cessions of 
western land from the states to help in its revenue needs.228 Since 
LoUISIANA PURCHASE 1803-1812, at 14-35,62-83 (1920). 
223. Senator Roger Griswold, a Federalist from Connecticut, thought that the Lou-
isiana Purchase was not constitutional without the concurrence of the original states. He 
argued that the United States was based originally on a co-partnership between the 
original colonies and that it made no sense for the executive and the Senate to use the 
treaty power to admit other states to the co-partnership without the approval of states 
already in the union. (Oct. 28, 1803) in 8 ANNALS 461...Q3, 8th Cong., 1st Sess. 
224. Samuel L. Mitchill (Jeffersonian, N.Y.) (Oct. 25, 1803) in 8 ANNALS 477-81, 8th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 
225. John Smilie (Jeffersonian, Pa.) and Joseph H. Nicholson (Jeffersonian, Mary-
land) argued that all rights not reserved to the states were given to the general govern-
ment, that the right to acquire territory was not retained by the states, and that therefore 
the power must be resident in the general government. in 8 ANNALS 457-58, 467-QS, 8th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 25, 1803). This position was starkly inconsistent with the general 
Jeffersonian position and the text of the Tenth Amendment that all powers not delegated 
to the federal government were retained by the states. 
226. James Elliot (Federalist, Vt.) (Oct. 25, 1803) in 8 ANNALS 447-49, 8th Cong. 1st 
Sess. 
227. Senator Caesar A. Rodney (Jeffersonian, Del.) (Oct. 25, 1803), in 13 ANNALS 
472, 8th Cong. 1st Sess. 
228. Report of a Committee of Carroll, Gorham, etc. 24 JCC 104 (Jan. 30, 1783). 
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powers of the old Congress carried over into the new, Congress 
under the Constitution has the power to acquire new territory 
and citizens.229 Thus it is not the power to acquire territory that 
is surprising, but rather the claims that no textual support is 
needed. 
Notwithstanding Rodney's fine argument, however, the law 
ultimately settled on the argument that acquisitions were inher-
ent in sovereignty, without need for enumeration. In Cross v. 
Harrison/30 the Supreme Court held in 1853 that the cessions of 
California to the United States by Mexico was constitutional, 
saying that "[t]he power. .. of the United States to acquire new 
territory does not depend upon any specific grant in the Consti-
tution to do so, but flows from its sovereignty over foreign com-
merce, war, treaties, and imposts."231 By the twentieth century, 
the Supreme Court decided that the enumerated powers doc-
trine applied only to internal affairs. For international affairs, 
the federal government had power arising from "sovereignty" 
that pre-existed the Constitution and arose upon independence 
from Great Britain.232 Foreign affairs fell on the federal side of 
everybody's line between federal and state spheres, so the con-
clusion is not surprising. 
If federal powers are implied without textual support for 
foreign affairs, then there is also a strong case for plenary federal 
powers for domestic issues as well. The "expressly delegated" 
language of old Article II that failed to survive from the Articles 
was also apparently necessary to limit the federal level within the 
domestic domain, given the background law. In the 1779 deci-
sion of Respublica v. Sweers, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
had reasoned that the United States was a plenary government 
by the mere act of the states coming together: 
From the moment of their association, the United States nec-
essarily became a body corporate: for there was no superior 
from whom that character would otherwise be derived. In 
England, the king, lords & commons are certainly a body cor-
229. John Randolph, House of Representatives, Oct. 25, 1803, Annals of Cong., 8th 
Cong. 1st Sess. 436 (justifying the Louisiana Purchase by saying that since the Confedera-
tion, "a loosely connected league,'' had settled its borders by acquiring territory and citi-
zens, so could the United States under the Constitution). 
230. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164 (1853). 
231. Id. at 173. 
232. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,316-19 (1936). 
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porate; and yet there was never any charter or statute by 
which they were expressly created.233 
Before the ratification of the Articles of Confederation, more-
over, the Congress acted as a de facto national government with-
out a written charter. For most of the duration of the Revolu-
tion~ War, Congress directed the financing and conduct of the 
war.23 Near the end of the war, the Articles of Confederation 
were ratified and the Articles provided that Congress had only 
the powers "expressly delegated" to it.235 That limitation was 
omitted in the Constitution, apparently leaving the default rule 
that the Congress needed no charter for its powers and had no 
limitation on its implied powers, whether domestic or foreign. 
Once the Court begins to find extra-constitutional powers from 
federal "sovereignty," why does it not extend to domestic issues? 
There is, of course, no need to go beyond the text of the 
Constitution to justify federal power over foreign issues. As Cae-
sar Rodney argued in 1803, Congress has the power to provide 
for the common defense and general welfare. By consensus, for-
eign affairs are issues within the "common" or "general" sphere. 
To go beyond the text of the Constitution is literally an outlaw 
claim. Undoubtedly a dire enough necessity can require an agent 
to go beyond of the written instructions, but why is that the first 
resort, when a power within the writing seems so reasonable? 
Indeed, I argue that the enumerated powers are merely illustra-
tive, which civilizes Jefferson's claim. On the ejusdem generis or 
233. Respublica v. Sweers, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 41, 44 (Pa. 1779} (upholding an indict-
ment for forgery and fraud on the United States); see also Penhallow v. Doane's Adm'rs, 
3 U.S. 54 (1795} (holding that the Continental Congress had the authority, before the 
Articles of Confederation were ratified, to institute a tribunal for determining prizes at 
sea and to hear appeals}. Ironically, the rule of Respublica v. Sweers that the United 
States government was plenary by mere association of the states appeared near the time 
of the debates, as far as I can tell, only in the work of James Wilson. JAMES WILSON, 
CONSIDERATIONS ON THE BANK OF NORTH AMERICA 12 (Philadelphia, 1785) (arguing 
that Congress's authorization to charter a national bank in 1781 was an implied power 
that arose from the mere joining together of the states, the "same as that of several 
voices collected together, which by their union, produces harmony, that was not to be 
found separately in each"}. 
234. See JACK RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLffiCS: AN 
INTERPRETATIVE HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 288 (1979) (arguing that 
the adoption of the Articles threatened to impose rather than remove obstacles to fed-
eral power "by substituting a written charter for the less precise mandate of the public 
good" that Congress had had before them"). 
235. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. II, 19 JCC 214 (March 1, 1781}. The "ex-
pressly delegated" limitation of Article II of the Articles of Confederation arose from a 
motion by Thomas Burke of North Carolina. See Letter from Thomas Burke to Gover-
nor Richard Caswell of North Carolina (Apr. 29, 1777), in 6 LE1TERS OF DELEGATES 
672. 
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illustrative argument, the powers of the federal government 
need to fall within what is considered the appropriately national 
sphere. The claim for unenumerated powers over foreign issues, 
in any event, belies the Jeffersonian claim that clauses 2-17 are 
exhaustive. There is no such thing as partially exhaustive. A con-
stitution cannot be both exhaustive and not exhaustive at the 
same time. 
B. EXPLODING POWERS: THE COMMERCE POWER236 
The third clause of the Constitution's description of federal 
powers allows Congress to "regulate Commerce with foreign Na-
tions, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
tribes. "237 The commerce clause is now usually considered to be 
the most general power of the federal government and the fron-
tier most likely to mark the outer boundaries of the federal 
range.238 But in the constitutional debates, the power to "regu-
late commerce" was a modest, even trivial power. "Regulate 
commerce" was most importantly a verbal cover for two mercan-
tile programs that did not have sufficient support for passage, 
even once the new Constitution allowed Congress to act. "Regu-
late commerce" was also a synonym for nationalizing the state 
tariffs or imposts, but that is a tax or revenue issue covered by 
other constitutional clauses. There was no substantial issue or 
debate in 1787-88 within the category of interstate commerce. 
It is, of course, perfectly consistent with the values of the 
Founders that congressional power should expand to cover the 
necessities and the common interests of the union. The path the 
expansion took, however, within the commerce clause, is best 
understood as a channel around the dam erected by the enumer-
ated powers doctrine. The commerce clause exploded in impor-
tance from its trivial original meaning only because the best 
reading of the Constitution -a general power to provide for the 
common defense and general welfare- was blocked by the sup-
position that clauses 2 through 17 were exhaustive. Common 
needs were satisfied not within the most natural channel-the 
236. This section is a short summary of Calvin Johnson, The Original Intent of the 
Commerce Clause, 13 WM & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1 (2004). 
237. U.S. CONST., art. I,§ 8, cl. 3. 
238. See, e.g., BERNARD SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A TExTBOOK 105 (2d 
ed. 1979) (saying that commerce clause is "plenary" and the "source of the most impor-
tant powers that the Federal Government exercises.") For a recent review of the judicial 
history of the scope of the commerce clause, see, for example, Barry Cushman, Formal-
ism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089, 1100-13 
(2000). 
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general power to provide for the common defense and general 
welfare-but by an explosive expansion of a trickle-size channel, 
the commerce power, which the enumerated powers doctrine al-
lowed. 
In its original meaning, the power "to regulate commerce" 
provided textual cover for only three programs, all involving 
deep-water shipping and mercantilist economics. The first pro-
gram was to nationalize the New York harbor's "impost" and 
other similar state tariffs, so that a federal impost could be used 
to pay Revolutionary War debts. Suppression of imports by tax-
ing them was a salutary goal under the mercantilist economic 
thinking of the times. Nationalizing the state imposts was called 
a "regulation of commerce," but it was also a tax program, ade-
quately authorized by clause 1, which gives Congress the power 
to tax. The other two programs within the cover of "regulated 
commerce" were also consistent with mercantilist policy, which 
held that the wealth of the nation would be improved by rigor-
ous government regulation. Interstate commerce does not show 
up in the debates, except as an afterthought, and there were no 
real proposed programs associated with interstate commerce. 
Words do have a penumbra beyond the programs their propo-
nents were trying to accomplish, but the words of any historical 
document are always actions attempting to find allies to accom-
plish a program. To understand the penumbra, one must first 
understand the core programs.239 
1. The Navigation Acts 
"Regulation of commerce" most commonly referred to a 
plan to impose a retaliatory impost or embargo on foreign ships 
coming into American ports in order to convince foreign powers 
to open their ports to American ships.240 The core grievance was 
239. See, e.g., Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding the History of Ideas, in 
MEANING AND UNDERSTANDING: QUENTIN SKINNER AND HIS CRmcs 3, 55-{i5, 260 
(James Tully ed.,1988) (reprinting 8 HISTORY AND THEORY 3 (1969)). 
240. See, e.g., Letter from James Monroe to James Madison (July 26, 1785), in 8 
MADISON PAPERS 329 (Virginia congressional delegate explains that Congress has pro-
posed to be granted the power to regulate commerce to obtain reciprocity from other 
nations); Edmund Randolph, Speech at the Federal Convention (May 29, 1787), in 1 
FARRAND'S RECORDS 19 (saying that among the advantages that the U.S. might acquire 
are "counteraction of the commercial regulations of other nations"); John Rutledge, 
Speech at the Federal Convention (Aug. 29, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS 452 (say-
ing that gaining access to the West Indies is the "great object" of regulating commerce); 
Edmund Randolph, Reasons for not Signing the Constitution (Dec. 27, 1787), in 8 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 260, 265 (saying that individual states can not organize retalia-
tion against foreign nations and that what is needed is "exclusion ... opposed to exclu-
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that the British Navigation Act granted a monopoly to British 
vessels for entry into British possessions in the West Indies. 
When the American states were still colonies, the purpose of giv-
ing incentives to British shipping by granting British shipping an 
exclusive franchise included stimulating American shipping. In 
the colonial period, there was an active trade between the West 
Indies and American ports. When America achieved independ-
ence, however, Britain decided that there was no reason to let 
American vessels into its West Indian ports.241 
The grievance against the British was generalized to include 
the power to retaliate against France and Spain for similar exclu-
sions. All great trading nations were said to have tried "to secure 
to themselves the advantages of their carrying trade. "242 John Jay 
complained that because of our "imbecility," all the empires im-
posed "commercial restraints upon us" so that there is not one 
English, French, or Spanish island or port in the West-Indies to 
which an American vessel can carry a cargo of flour for sale.243 
A retaliatory impost or embargo required a uniform policy 
for all American ports. When Massachusetts tried to impose a 
retaliatory tax on British ships to force Britain to open the ports 
of the British West Indies, other states undercut Massachusetts 
by welcoming British ships into their ports.244 A state embargo 
or impost would be ineffective if a neighboring state provided an 
easy end run. 
The proposal to impose a retaliatory impost against the 
British, however, came to naught. When Madison proposed re-
sion, and restriction to restriction"); NEW JERSEY JOURNAL (June 18, 1788), reprinted in 
18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 185 (saying that "[t]he moment the English know we can 
retaliate, that moment they will relax in their restrictions on our commerce"); William R. 
Davie, Speech to North Carolina Ratification Convention (July 24, 1788), in 4 ELLIOT'S 
DEBATES 18 (arguing that the United States should be empowered to compel foreign 
nations into commercial regulations and counter British insults). 
241. See LORD SHEFFIELD, OBSERVATIONS ON THE COMMERCE OF THE UNITED 
STATES 264-65 (6th ed. 1784), described in JOHN E. CROWLEY, THE PRIVILEGES OF 
INDEPENDENCE: NEOMERCANTIUSM AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 81-83 (1993); 
STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRJCK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 69 (1993). 
242. Thomas Russell, Speech to the Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Feb. 1, 
1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 139. 
243. JOHN JAY, ADDRESSTOTHEPEOPLEOFTHESTATEOFNEWYORK 7 (Sept. 17, 
1787), reprinted in PAMPHLETS67, 73 
244. Letter from Gaspard Joseph Amand Ducher to Comte de Ia Luzerne (Feb. 2, 
1788), in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 13 (saying that Massachusetts and New Hamp-
shire had both attempted to exclude British ships to punish Britain for its strictness 
against American commerce, but had suspended the attempt because .C?mpet!-ng ports ~ 
other states would not join the embargo and thereby attracted Bnush ships to theu 
ports). 
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taliation against the British in the first session of the new Con-
gress, the Senate, lead by the New York delegation, stripped the 
anti-British features from the 1789 impost bill.245 Great Britain 
was allowing American ships into the British home ports without 
restriction or discrimination, and opponents of retaliation feared 
that Britain might retaliate in turn if faced with American port 
restrictions.246 Madison's plan for discrimination against the Brit-
ish was not included in the enacted impost.247 
A retaliatory impost against British shipping probably never 
was a good idea. There were not very many British ships coming 
into American ports against which to retaliate because American 
shipping was on its way to monopolizing transatlantic shipping 
by successful competition and good American oak. By 1796, 
American ships were carrying over 90 percent of transatlantic 
commerce.248 A penalty against British ships would not have 
been much of an economic stick, even if it extinguished the last 
of them. Penalties would also have angered the British, perhaps 
into retaliation against American ships entering British ports. 
American shipping could not afford a trade war with Great Brit-
ain. The British West Indies' prohibitions on American ships, 
moreover, were porous; the islands themselves were happY to 
encourage evasion of the prohibitions on American ships.2 
A second reference of the phrase, "regulation of com-
merce," was to a proposal to give Congress the power to imitate 
the same British Navigation Act that offended the Framers. An 
American Navigation Act would have required that all Ameri-
can commodities would be exported only on American ships.250 
245. See ELKINS & McKITRICK, supra note 241, at 766 n. 66 (collecting the evidence 
that the New York merchants opposed discrimination). 
246. Editorial Note, in 12 MADISON PAPERS 55; Editorial Note, in 12 JEFFERSON 
PAPERS 521-26; cf. John Laurence, Speech in the House of Representatives (Apr. 21, 
1789), in 1 ANNALS 192, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. (arguing that England did not discriminate 
against American vessels corning into England.) 
247. An Act for Laying Duties on Goods, Wares and Merchandise Imported in the 
United States, July 4, 1789, 1 STAT. 24-27. May 16 and May 26, 1789, in 1 ANNALS 365-
66,409, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. (passing a 5% impost, but rejecting discrimination). 
248. ELKINS& MCKITRICK, supra note 241, at 414 (93%). 
249. See, e.g., id., at 131 (finding a treaty opening West Indies would just confirm 
what was already accessible informally.) 
250. See, e.g., The Landholder VI, CoNNECilCUf CouRANT, reprinted in 3 FARRAND's 
RECORDS 164 (Dec. 10, 1787) (arguing that George Mason opposed the Constitution be-
cause a navigation act would exclude foreign bottoms from carrying American produce 
to market and throw a monopoly of the carrying business into Northern hands); Thomas 
Dawes, Speech to Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Jan. 21, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S 
DEBATES. 58 (objecting that without the Constitution's regulation of commerce, a vessel 
from Halifax "finds as hearty a welcome with its fish and whalebone at the southern 
ports, as though it was built, navigated, and freighted from Salem or Boston"); James 
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The Constitution was written long before Adam Smith, laissez 
faire, and free trade came to dominate economic philosophy.251 
The Founders were arch-mercantilists. In true mercantilist 
terms, James Madison traced most of our political and moral er-
rors to an absence of regulation of foreign commerce and an un-
favorable balance of trade, which drained us of our precious spe-
cie.252 Hamilton denounced the argument that trade would 
regulate itself as a "wild speculative paradox[] ... contrary to the 
sense of the most enlightened nations. "253 Madison denounced 
those who were "decoying the people into a belief that trade 
ought to be left to regulate itself. "25 In 1784, in the mercantilist 
spirit, Madison sponsored a port bill in the Virginia Assembly, 
which would have required trade between Virginians and foreign 
ports had to be conducted out of a single Virginia port.255 The 
port preferences have been said to be the "economic center-
piece" of the Madisonian coalition out of which the Constitu-
tional movement arose.256 Both Thomas Jefferson257 and George 
Washington258 supported the port monopoly proposal. 
Bowdoin, Speech in the Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Feb. 1, 1788), in 2 
ELUOT'S DEBATES 129 (arguing that well being of trade depends upon the proper regu-
lation of it and unregulated trade has ruined rather than enriched those who carry it on); 
Thomas Russell, Speech in the Massachusetts Ratification Convention (Feb. 1, 1788), in 2 
ELUOT'S DEBATES 139 (arguing that Congress should confine shipping to American ves-
sels); HUGH WILUAMSON, SPEECH AT EDENTON, NORTH CAROLINA, NOVEMBER 8, 
1181,printed in THE DAILY ADVERTISER (NEW YoRK) (Feb. 25-27, 1788) (saying that 
by regulations of commerce, Congress can "secure the carrying trade in the hands of citi-
zens in preference to strangers"), reprinted in 2 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 227, 
231; Alexander Hamilton, Debate in New York Ratification Convention (June 20, 1788), 
in 2 ELUOT'S DEBATES 236 (saying that it was in the interest of the northern states that 
Congress be able "to make commercial regulations in favor of their own, and in restraint 
of the navigation of foreigners"). 
251. See, e.g., DOUGLAS IRWIN, AGAINST THE TIDE: AN INTELLECfUAL HISTORY 
OF FREE TRADE 80 (1996) (observing that Adam Smith's ideas on free trade did not be-
gin to get cited as orthodoxy among economists until at least a quarter century after they 
were published in 1776). It is not uncommon to find descriptions of the Madisonian Con-
stitution as "a part of the liberal, free trade tradition," John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. 
Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REv. 511, 527 (2000), but those 
descriptions have to be understood as solely aspirational and not as descriptions of the 
times. 
252. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 18, 1786), in 8 MADISON 
PAPERS 500, 501. 
253. Alexander Hamilton, Continentalist V (Apr. 18, 1782), in 3 HAMILTON PAPERS 
75, 76. 
254. See Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Aug. 20, 1785), in 8 
MADISON PAPERS 102. 
255. See Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (June 21, 1785), in 8 
MADISON PAPERS 306, 307. 
256. See BRUCE A. RAGSDALE, A PLANTERS' REPUBLIC: THE SEARCH FOR 
ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE IN REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA 269 (1996). 
257. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Nov. 11, 1784), in 8 
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As with retaliation against the British exclusions, nothing 
came of the suggestion for an American Navigation Act. The 
Constitution itself eviscerated an American Navigation act by 
prohibiting Congress from imposing any tax on exports.259 The 
prohibition on export tax meant that Congress could not give a 
tax preference to American ships carrying southern commodi-
ties. Congress would have had to take the far more radical 'step 
of banning foreign ships from carrying American exports en-
tirely. Congress never seriously considered a complete prohibi-
tion. On the import side, where tax was allowed, Congress did 
discriminate for a while against imports on foreign ships. The 
first tonnage fees imposed a tax of 6 cents per ton on American 
owned ships, but 50 cents per ton on foreign-owned ships. 260 Dis-
crimination was gutted by the Jay Treaty of 1786 with Great 
Britain, however, which obligated the United States and Great 
Britain to stop imposing higher taxes on each other's ships/61 
and it seems to have been ended for all foreign shiB:s in 1799 
when general impost rates were raised to 10 percent. 2 The call 
for a monopoly for American ships to carry American commodi-
ties never had enough support even to get debated in Congress. 
Proposals that came to naught by reason of insufficient support, 
even once permitted, do not enhance the modest commerce 
clause. 
2. Nationalizing the State Imposts 
"Regulation of commerce" was also a synonym for national-
izing state imposts so that the revenue from import taxes could 
be used to pay war debts and not be limited to exclusively state 
purposes. New York state's impost on goods entering through 
New York harbor was especially hated. New York had vetoed a 
1783 proposal to give the federal government a tax of its own, 
MADISON PAPERS 127. 
258. RAGSDALE, supra note 256, at 149. 
259. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9, cl. 5. 
260. An Act for Imposing Duties on Tonnage, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. ch. 3, 1 Stat. 27 
(July 20, 1789) renewed, An Act Imposing Duties on the Tonnage of Ships or Vessels, ch. 
30,1 Stat. 135 (July 30, 1790). 
261. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation [Jay Treaty], Art. III, XV (con-
cluded Nov. 124, 1794, ratified Feb. 1795, and promulgated Feb. 29, 1796), reprinted in 
SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, JAY'S TREATY: A STUDY IN COMMERCE AND DIPLOMACY 333-
34 (1921). 
262. An Act to Regulate the Collection of Duties on Imports and Tonnage, ch. 22, 
§ 61 (March 2, 1799) (imposing tax of 10% of cost). Imports from beyond the Cape of 
Good Hope were taxed at 20% of cost, see id., presumably because they would have a far 
larger mark up than imports for example from Europe. 
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the 5 percent impost.263 New York would veto again if given the 
chance2 so as to tax her neighbors "by the regulation of her trade." 64 In Connecticut, the proponents of the Constitution 
warned that those "gentlemen in New York who receive large 
salaries . . . know that their offices will be more insecure ... 
when the expenses of government shall be paid by their con-
stituents, than while paid by us."265 New Jersey repudiated the 
1786 requisition based on the argument that New Jersey had 
paid enough tax already because it received its imports through 
New York and Philadelphia.266 New Jersey, caught between 
Philadelphia and New York, was "a Cask tapped at both 
ends."26 As Hamilton explained in Federalist No. 7, New York 
had rendered Connecticut and New Jersey tributary to New 
York by its "commercial regulations," meaning tax.268 Federaliz-
ing the imposts was the feature of the commerce clause that gen-
erated almost universal assent outside New York.269 
In Federalist No. 42, Madison said that the object of the 
power to regulate commerce was relief for the "[ s ]tates which 
import and export through other States from the improper con-
tributions levied on them by the latter."270 In Federalist No. 40, 
he said that "[a]n acknowledged object of the Convention and 
the universal expectation of the people was that the regulation of 
trade should be submitted to the general government in such a 
form as would render it an immediate source of general reve-
nue. "271 Imposts were relatively popular taxes under the mercan-
tilism of the times, which disapproved of imports that drained 
specie. We need a controlling Union government to regulate 
263. JOHN P. KAMINSKI, GEORGE CLINTON: YEOMAN POLITICIAN OF THE NEW 
REPUBLIC 89-96 (1993). New York, in form, merely set new conditions on approval, in-
cluding a New York state officer being appointed to collect the revenue and New York 
paper money being accepted for the tax, but the conditions were understood on both 
sides to be tantamount to a veto. New York paper would not help pay Dutch or French 
or Pennsylvanian creditors. 
264. Nathaniel Gorham, Speech at the Federal Convention (July 23, 1787), in 2 
FARRAND'S RECORDS 90. 
265. Editorial, NEW ENGLAND CONNECTICUT COURANT {Dec. 24, 1787), reprinted 
in 15 DOCUMENTARY HisTORY 80, 82. 
266. See VOTES AND PROCEEDING OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF 
NEW JERSEY 12, Sess. 10, 2d sitting {1786); see RUTH BOGIN, ABRAHAM CLARK AND 
THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA, 1774-1794, at 127-31 {1982). 
267. James Madison, Preface to Debates in the Convention of 1787 (ca. 1830), in 3 
FARRAND'S RECORDS 539,542. 
268. 1HEFEDERALISTNO. 7, at40 {Hamilton) {Nov. 17, 1787). 
269. Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in 
Contemporary Comment, 25 MINN. L. REv. 432, 451 (1941). 
270. 1HE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 283 (Madison) (Jan, 22, 1788) (emphasis added). 
271. THE FEDERALIST No. 40, at 262 {Madison) {Jan. 18, 1788). 
2005] DUBIOUS ENUMERATED POWER DOCTRINE 89 
commerce, George Washington wrote, to balance against the 
"luxurv, effiminacy and corruption" introduced by foreign 
trade?'~2 
In 1829, Madison would claim that the imposts were the 
only "commerce" issue and that the clause was intended, not as a 
positive grant of power, but rather as a negative by which to pre-
vent injustice among the states themselves.273 That ignores the 
proposal to require exports be carried in American ships, which 
never came to anything, but it is a judgment about the impor-
tance of issues under the commerce clause as Madison viewed 
them retroactively. 
The commerce clause was not necessary, however, to na-
tionalize the state imposts. Clause 1 of article I, section 8 gives 
Congress the power to tax and lists imposts as one of the taxes 
that Congress may impose, provided only that the rates are uni-
form across the states. The Constitution also separately prohibits 
states from imposing their own imposts, except with the permis-
sion of Congress.274 We now also tend to call a tax on imports a 
tax issue, rather than an issue under "regulation of commerce," 
although the legitimate usage of the times often treated tax and 
regulation of commerce as synonyms. 
3. Interstate Commerce 
The important programs under the commerce clause were 
deep-water shipping issues, involving the British and American 
Navigation Acts and the state taxes on imports. The commerce 
clause, however, also gives Congress the power to regulate 
commerce with the Indian tribes and among the several states. It 
is commonly said that the major purpose of the commerce clause 
was to prevent protectionist economic policies among the states 
and to establish a common market with free trade across state 
borders.275 Interstate commerce, however, was in fact not impor-
tant in the constitutional debates. 
272 See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to James Warren (Oct. 7, 1785), in 3 
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Reducing barriers on interstate trade was not an important 
part of the constitutional debates, mostly because the goal had 
already been accomplished. The Articles of Confederation had 
already prohibited any state from imposing a "duty, imposition 
or restriction" on any out-of-state citizens that it did not impose 
on its own inhabitants.276 The states seem to have largely fol-
lowed the norm, well enough that the issue did not number 
among the issues the debaters were most concerned about. Con-
sistent with the norm and with the mandate of the Articles, the 
state imposts almost always exempted American source goods 
from tax.277 The New York impost that was a major irritant to its 
neighbors exempted goods and merchandise of American 
"growth and manufacture."278 The Pennsylvania impost, which 
also drained New Jersey, also exempted goods of American 
"growth, produce or manufacture. "279 The Massachusetts impost 
had the same exemption?80 Virginia had a 1 srercent impost on 
goods from "any port or place whatsoever,"2 but Virginia was 
shamed into giving the usual exemption for goods of American 
growth or manufacture in Janua~ 1, 1788, at which time it also 
increased the rate to 3 percent.2 Virginia's impost, before its 
amendment, seems to have been the most serious violation of 
the norm against interstate tolls. 
Protecting out-of-state individuals against discrimination by 
a state was an established and important norm at the time, but 
the norm shows up in the constitutional debates almost entirely 
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in issues other than interstate barriers. In the debates, the consti-
tution's prohibition on paper money issued by states283 was said 
to be necessary to prevent "aggressions on the rights of other 
States"284 and "injury to the citizens of other States."285 Paper 
money was a trick, Govemeur Morris explained, "by which Citi-
zens of other States may be affected. "286 
Hamilton did use the specter of trade barriers to scare vot-
ers into ratifying the Constitution. In Federalist No. 22, Hamilton 
argued that if the Constitution were not ratified, the various 
states would impose multiple duties on interstate transportation, 
much as the separate German states imposed tolls on the great 
rivers that flow through Germany.287 The thrust of the com-
plaints, however, is not to any barriers under the Articles, but 
rather to a threat of what might happen if the unity of the 
United States fell apart. Hamilton's example of interstate barri-
ers came from the German states, not from America. Tolls on 
interstate commerce would require not just a failure to ratify the 
Constitution, under Hamilton's argument, but also a repeal of 
the Articles of Confederation's prohibition on interstate barri-
ers, as well as an overriding of the "genius of the American peo-
ple. "288 Interstate tolls were a hobgoblin that Hamilton used to 
scare the ratifiers. 
As one superb review of the evidence put it, "the thing that 
strikes one's attention in seeking reference to interstate com-
merce is theirJ>aucity." 289 The commerce clause was "a modest 
little power."2 When Madison recorded the Convention's adop-
tion of the commerce clause, without discussion or opposition, 
on August 16, 1787, he described the clause as the "[c]lause for 
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regulating commerce with foreign nation and &c. "291 Regulation 
of commerce among the states shows up only within the "&c." 
Given its modest original size, the modem importance of 
the commerce clause comes, much like a panda's thumb, because 
of evolutionary growth. A panda's thumb is apparently not a 
thumb at all, but is rather an evolutionary development from a 
once-tiny wrist bone, which evolved over time into a sharp tool 
to strip bamboo.292 Similarly, the commerce clause, authorizing 
Congress to adopt some deep-water shipping restrictions the na-
tion did not really want, was once a small power, not much big-
ger than a wrist bone. Its humble roots do not mean that it is il-
legitimate. Pandas, for example, do need their bamboo-stripping 
"thumbs" for survival. The growth of the commerce clause was 
driven by "the common interests of the union." Still the meaning 
of the commerce clause in historical context was modest. The 
better textual explanation for the expanse of the commerce 
clause under current law is found in clause 1, which allows Con-
gress to provide for the common defense and general welfare. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The enumerated power doctrine maintains that Congress 
may only act for the activities listed in clauses 2 through 17 of ar-
ticle I, section 8. Even the necessary and proper clause at the end 
of the enumeration and the tax clause that precedes it were at 
one time said not to expand Congress's power beyond the enu-
meration. 
The claim that the enumeration is exhaustive has never re-
flected our actual practice. When activities necessary for the 
common interest arise, we generally find that they are author-
ized although not enumerated. Sometimes the unenumerated 
power is implied without any basis in text. In the ratification de-
bate, the federal passport system was said to be allowed al-
though not expressed. Jefferson found that the power to pur-
chase Florida and Louisiana were not within the enumeration, 
but still implied. Thus, the enumeration is said to be exhaustive, 
except where it is not. 
We also have allowed powers for the exigencies of the union 
to be covered by the enumeration by stretching the words to fit 
291. 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS 308. 
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the desired power. Thus "necessary and proper" was expanded 
to cover a national bank, against the opposition of the Jefferson-
ians. The power to regulate commerce was a very modest power 
in the 1787 debates, but it has exploded in the last seventy years 
to cover many of the necessities of the union. 
In clause 1 of its description of the federal domain, the Con-
stitution gives Congress the power "to provide for the common 
Defence and general Welfare of the United States." The phrase 
is a synonym for the governing Convention resolution, which al-
lowed Congress to "legislate for the common interests of the Un-
ion." While clause 1 is a tax clause, the necessary and proper 
clause allows other instrumentalities to be used for the common 
defense and general welfare once tax is allowed. The Founders 
would have drawn no serious line to deny federal regulation 
once federal taxation was allowed. 
An enduring Constitution should consist only of general 
provisions, Hamilton told the New York ratifying convention. It 
would be absurd to fix the division between federal and state ob-
jects in a Constitution, he said, because the text would then be 
too complicated and intricate and because an alteration of cir-
cumstances would make a change in the division indispensa-
ble.293 The enduring principle intended by the founders was that 
the new federal government would undertake only things for the 
common or general interest, leaving local issues to the states 
where they could be of service. The detailed federal powers to 
provide for an army or navy or uniform immigration system 
were programs the Federalists wanted to accomplish, but they 
were also detailed illustrations of a general principle. The enu~ 
merated powers were not intended as restrictions on the necessi-
ties of the union, by way of petty limitations, and they are also 
not the grand principle itself. It is after all a Constitution that we 
are interpreting. 
The principle that Congress has a general power to provide 
for the common Defence and general Welfare is consistent with 
both the text of the Constitution and with our actual constitu-
tional practices. The common defense and general welfare stan-
dard tells us how far to stretch the words of the enumeration and 
when implied powers are appropriate. The enumerated powers 
are illustrative of the appropriately national sphere, but not ex-
haustive. We need to go back to the fork in the road where we 
293. Alexander Hamilton, Speech to the New York Ratification Convention (June 
28, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 364. 
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went down the path adopting the enumerated powers doctrine. 
We need to read our Constitution properly to allow the federal 
government to provide for the "common Defence and general 
Welfare" of the United States. 
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